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Optimal CEO Compensation with Search:
Theory and Empirical Evidence∗
MELANIE CAO and RONG WANG
Abstract
We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a
market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an
idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside
options and captures contracting externalities. We show that the optimal pay-to-performance
ratio is less than one even when the CEO is risk neutral. Moreover, the equilibrium pay-to-
performance sensitivity depends positively on a firm’s idiosyncratic risk and negatively on the
systematic risk. Our empirical tests using executive compensation data confirm these results.
Keywords: executive compensation, principal-agent problem, search, endogenous outside
options, dynamic market equilibrium.
JEL classifications: J33, G13.
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Two questions concerning executive compensation deserve particular attention. The first is:
how does a firm’s risk aﬀect CEO’s pay-to-performance sensitivity (hereafter PPS), that is, the
ratio of incentive pay to firm performance? Standard agency models predict that PPS does not
change with firm risk if the agent is risk neutral and decreases with firm risk if the agent is risk
averse. Notable examples are Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, pp160-162), Holmstrom (1982),
and Murphy (1999, pp27-28). In contrast to this theoretical prediction, however, the empirical
evidence on the eﬀect of firm risk on PPS is mixed. For example, Core and Guay (1999) and Oyer
and Shaefer (2005) find a positive relationship while Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) document a
negative relationship.1
The second question pertains to the large increase in CEO compensation that has accompanied
the increase in firm size over the past three decades. This large increase has generated intense
debate among both the public and academics as to whether CEOs are overcompensated. Although
the increase in firm value contributed in part to the increase in CEO pay, a closer look at the
data (see Section IV for a detailed description of the data) reveals that incentive pay, which
is the predominant component of CEO pay, increased more rapidly than the increase in firm
value. From 1994 to 2009, median incentive pay increased by 244% in real terms, compared
with a 40% increase in median firm value, and its share of total pay increased from 41% to
788%. Further, total CEO pay outpaced firm value. The ratio between CEO pay and firm value
increased from $159 in 1994 to $173 in 2009 per $1 000. These observations suggest that the
key to understanding the increase in CEO compensation is understanding what factors determine
PPS.
We argue that two factors, both arising from the notion that executive contracts should be
designed to maximize firm value in a market economy, are important for PPS. One is CEO job
mobility. When diﬀerent firms compete for CEOs, each firm has an incentive to design contracts
to increase the probability of retention. Thus, changes in market conditions can aﬀect PPS by
aﬀecting the severity of competition for CEOs. The second factor is the composition of risks
faced by a firm. By switching from one firm to another, a CEO can change the amount of
idiosyncratic risk to which he is exposed, but not aggregate systematic risk since all firms face
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the same systematic risk. PPS should therefore depend on these two types of risks diﬀerently.
To incorporate these factors, we integrate an agency model into search theory to determine
incentive contracts in a market equilibrium, and then empirically evaluate the model. Search the-
ory endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and enables us to distinguish idiosyncratic risks
from systematic risks. The integrated model captures the intuitive mechanism that competition
among firms for CEOs aﬀects incentive contracts in the equilibrium by aﬀecting a CEO’s incentive
to participate in a firm. To distinguish the eﬀect of competition on the incentive contract from
the eﬀect of risk aversion, we focus on risk-neutral and eﬀort-averse CEOs.
In our model, there are many firms and CEOs. In each period, a firm’s output depends on an
aggregate shock, an idiosyncratic shock, and the CEO’s eﬀort. The aggregate shock is publicly
observed while the idiosyncratic shock, which captures the match quality between the firm and
the CEO at a particular point in time, is the CEO’s private information. The firm oﬀers an
incentive contract that can be contingent on its output and the aggregate shock, but not directly
on the idiosyncratic shock and the CEO’s eﬀort. The CEO decides whether to accept the oﬀer
after observing the idiosyncratic shock. If he quits, he can search for a new job. Due to the
competition among firms, a CEO’s outside option depends on the probability of getting a new
job and the compensation at the new job. This link between a CEO’s outside option and other
firms’ contracts implies that a market equilibrium must determine all firms’ contracts and agents’
outside options simultaneously. We focus on a stationary and symmetric equilibrium in which all
firms oﬀer the same type of contracts.
To determine the equilibrium, we first analyze an individual firm’s optimal contract under
arbitrarily fixed outside options for CEOs and firms. The value of the outside option to a contract
participant is defined as the diﬀerence between the value of quitting and searching on the one
hand and the future value of staying in the contractual relationship on the other. We prove that
the optimal PPS is less than one, in spite of a risk-neutral CEO. This result arises because a CEO
can choose whether to quit after privately observing the idiosyncratic shock. If the idiosyncratic
shock is contractible or the CEO is forbidden to quit, the optimal contract would set PPS to
one, as is well known in agency models with a risk-neutral agent. Such a contract would align
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the CEO’s eﬀort perfectly with the objective of maximizing the joint surplus of the match, and
the firm would vary the base wage with the idiosyncratic shock to obtain the maximum share of
the joint surplus. However, because the idiosyncratic shock is the CEO’s private information, it
is not feasible to make the base wage contingent on such a shock. The CEO will choose to stay
to obtain the high payoﬀ when the idiosyncratic shock is high, and will quit to insulate himself
from the low payoﬀ when the shock is low. In this setting, it is optimal for the firm to set PPS
below one to get part of the high surplus when the idiosyncratic shock is high and compensate for
the low payoﬀ when the CEO quits. In fact, the firm chooses PPS and the base wage to obtain
the optimal trade-oﬀ between the retention probability and the expected profit conditional on
retention.
When the optimal PPS is below one, it can be aﬀected by aggregate and idiosyncratic risks.
When the outside options are arbitrarily fixed, the two risks have the same qualitative eﬀect on
PPS. Specifically, they aﬀect PPS negatively if and only if the joint value of the CEO’s and the
firm’s outside options for the current period is positive.2 This eﬀect of the risks on PPS arises
from a new mechanism in our model whereby a firm trades oﬀ retention and profit conditional
on retention, not from risk aversion as in the standard agency models cited above. To see this,
consider the case in which the risk (either aggregate risk or idiosyncratic risk) increases. An
increase in the risk increases a firm’s expected profit conditional on retention, which increases
a firm’s incentive to retain the CEO. However, when the value of the CEO’s outside option is
high, the probability of retaining the CEO is low. Therefore, it is optimal for the firm to increase
retention probability by increasing the base wage and reducing PPS. The opposite holds when
the risk decreases. Thus, overall, PPS is negatively related to aggregate and idiosyncratic risks
under positive outside options.
Next, we endogenize the outside options, determine the market equilibrium, and explore new
predictions of the equilibrium. In contrast to the partial equilibrium with fixed outside options,
the two risks now have opposite eﬀects on PPS in the equilibrium. This diﬀerence stems from two
externalities due to endogenizing outside options: the interactions between firm contracts and the
dependence of the matching probability on the contracts through competitive entry of vacancies.
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Under these externalities, the joint value of a firm’s and a CEO’s outside options increases with
idiosyncratic risk and decreases with aggregate risk. The intuition is as follows. An increase in
idiosyncratic risk increases the dispersion in match value, which induces both the CEO and the
firm to search for a new match with a higher expected profit. In contrast, an increase in aggregate
risk increases the profit of all firms uniformly, and thus reduces the motivation for the CEO and
the firm to search. This link between risks and outside options serves as a bridge between risks
and PPS. Specifically, an increase in idiosyncratic risk increases the CEO’s outside option, which
intensifies the competition among firms for CEOs. As a result, firms must increase the equilibrium
PPS so that the CEO can capture more of the surplus and is less likely to quit.3 In contrast, an
increase in aggregate risk reduces the CEO’s incentive to search, which weakens the competition
and triggers firms to lower the equilibrium PPS. It should be noted that the opposite eﬀect of the
two risks on the optimal PPS is unique to the market equilibrium with search. When the outside
options are exogenous as commonly assumed in the agency literature, PPS responds to the two
risks in the same direction, as discussed above.
Finally, we empirically test two new predictions of our model. First, the equilibrium PPS
depends negatively on systematic risk and positively on idiosyncratic risk. Second, because PPS
responds to the two risks diﬀerently, so does the ratio of a CEO’s total compensation to firm
value in the equilibrium. This ratio depends negatively on systematic risk and positively on
idiosyncratic risks. The empirical tests find robust support for these predictions.
We contribute to the labor search literature (e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)) by inte-
grating incentive contracts into a search model to examine CEO compensation and empirically
testing the model’s implications.4 To the principal-agent literature (e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont
(2005) and references therein), our paper contributes along three dimensions. First, we explicitly
model CEOs’ quitting decisions and study incentive contracts that induce both optimal eﬀort
and optimal retention. Second, we endogenously determine the eﬀects of market conditions on
a CEO’s outside option. Third, we analyze the optimal contract in a dynamic equilibrium in
which firms interact in the CEO job market. This dynamic equilibrium structure contrasts with
typical agency models, such as Jin (2002) and Garvey and Milbourn (2003), that analyze the
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optimal contract in a static setting with a single agent-firm pair where the joint outside option
value is assumed to be positive since the CEO has a positive reservation utility while the principal
has zero reservation value. The common conclusion of these studies is that PPS decreases with
idiosyncratic risk. The negative eﬀect of idiosyncratic risk on PPS is consistent with our partial
equilibrium analysis when the joint outside option value is positive. However, in a dynamic equi-
librium setting such as that in our model, the joint outside option value for the current period
can be either positive or negative. Specifically, when the future value of continuing the match
is higher than the value of breaking up the match, the joint outside option value for the current
period is negative, in which case PPS increases with idiosyncratic risk. More importantly, our
market equilibrium analysis shows that the equilibrium PPS increases with idiosyncratic risk due
to contracting externalities. This new result oﬀers a possible explanation for the mixed evidence
on the empirical relationship between a firm’s total risk and PPS.5
Our paper is also related to Oyer (2004) and Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009). Similar
to our model, Oyer (2004) recognizes that an agent may choose not to participate in a contract
in certain states of the world. However, he assumes that the outside option is exogenous and he
does not study a market equilibrium. Moreover, he studies broad-based stock option plans for
lower-ranked workers and abstracts from the eﬀort-inducing mechanism on the ground that such
plans have limited incentive eﬀects on workers. Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) use the
same assumption, as we do, that the shocks and the agent’s eﬀort are multiplicative in a firm’s
profit function, but they study a diﬀerent mechanism (i.e., positive assortative matching) and
their objective is to explain the negative relationship between the CEO’s eﬀective equity stake
and firm size, - they do not analyze the eﬀects of risks on PPS.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the model, formulates
individuals’ decision problems, and defines the market equilibrium. Section II examines the
optimal contract under fixed outside options. Section III discusses the contracting externalities
and determines the market equilibrium. Section IV presents the empirical analyses, and Section
V concludes the paper. Proofs and tables are provided in the Appendices.
I. A Search Market with Incentive Contracts
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In this section we describe the environment of the model economy, set up individual
CEOs’ and firms’ decision problems, and define the market equilibrium.
A. The Environment of The Model Economy
Consider an infinite-horizon economy in discrete time. There are many infinitely lived
CEOs whose measure is normalized to one. In each period, a CEO is either employed or unem-
ployed. If a CEO is unemployed, he receives utility  in the period, which includes the utility of
extra leisure as well as monetary benefit during unemployment. In addition, the CEO can search
for a job. If a CEO is employed, he chooses the level of eﬀort to exert on the job, , and earns
income . Utility in the period is ( ) =  − 22, where the constant   0 reflects a CEO’s
eﬀort aversion. Note that a CEO is risk neutral in income. This assumption ensures that risk
aversion is not a determinant of PPS, as emphasized in the agency literature. Instead, we focus
on a new mechanism that centers on the interactions between firms in the market equilibrium.
There are also many firms whose measure is endogenously determined by job creation. In each
period, a firm either has or does not have a CEO. A firm without a CEO can incur a recruiting
cost  to search for a CEO. If a firm has a CEO, profit in the period before paying the CEO is
 ≡ (  ) =   12   12 (1)
where  is a shock specific to the firm-CEO pair in the period and  is an aggregate or systematic
shock in the period. The idiosyncratic shock  is identically and independently distributed on
[ ¯] across matches and over time, where ¯    0. We assume that the cumulative distribution
function, 1(), is uniform so that the mean of  is  = (+ ¯) 2 and the standard deviation
is  = (¯− ) (2√3). The aggregate shock  is identically and independently distributed
over time according to the cumulative distribution function 2(), with mean  and standard
deviation 2. Note that the profit function is multiplicative between eﬀort  and the shocks
( ), which captures the intuitive notion that the marginal productivity of eﬀort is higher when
a firm experiences higher shocks.6 When CEOs are risk neutral, this multiplicative specification
is necessary for a nontrivial analysis. In particular, if the profit function is additive between eﬀort
and the shocks, then the shocks do not aﬀect the optimal choice of eﬀort and, with risk neutrality,
this implies that the risks generated by the shocks have no eﬀect on PPS.
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Idiosyncratic risk can be understood as the match quality between the CEO and the firm in
the current period, rather than a permanent characteristic of the firm, the CEO, or the match. For
example, a high match quality means that a CEO’s talent, experience, education, and personal
objective match well in this particular period with the firm’s size, nature of business, strategic
direction, organizational culture, and so on. A CEO who is well matched with a firm at one
point in time may not be well matched with the firm at another point in time if one of the
above-mentioned CEO or firm characteristics has changed.7 To capture the realistic feature that
a CEO might have a better idea than a firm about the match quality, we assume that the
realization of the idiosyncratic shock  is a CEO’s private information. This assumption on  is
central to the results in this paper because a CEO’s quitting decision is nontrivial only when 
is noncontractible, as we demonstrate below.
A firm oﬀers a sequence of one-period contracts to the CEO.8 As in the literature, eﬀort is
a CEO’s private information and not verifiable. In contrast, the aggregate shock  and profit 
are publicly observed. However, knowing  and  is not suﬃcient for an outsider to disentangle
eﬀort  and the idiosyncratic shock . To simplify the analysis and to facilitate comparison with
well-known models, we assume that the contract in each period has the following linear form:
 = ( ) = +   where  ≡ ( ).
That is, total CEO compensation consists of a base wage, , and a profit-sharing payment, .
The profit-sharing ratio, , is referred to as PPS. Note that  and  can be functions of  but not
of the unobservable  and . For brevity, we refer to  as a contract.
To clarify the elements of the economy, we depict the timing of events in each period in Figure
1.
Figure 1 is here.
A period consists of four stages. The first stage is exogenous separation in which a CEO separates
exogenously from the firm into unemployment with probability  ∈ [0 1). This exogenous separa-
tion represents the turnover of CEOs caused by reasons other than those modeled explicitly here,
such as job separation caused by family relocation. The second stage involves contract oﬀers and
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quitting decisions. In this stage, a firm with a CEO oﬀers a contract to the CEO, after which
the idiosyncratic shock  is realized and the CEO then chooses whether to accept the contract
or to quit and become unemployed. The third stage is eﬀort choice and production, whereby the
aggregate shock  is realized, a CEO who stays with the firm chooses eﬀort, profit is generated,
and the CEO is paid according to the contract.9 The fourth stage is search and matching. Here,
an unmatched CEO receives the benefit  and searches for a match, while a firm without a CEO
pays the recruiting cost  to seek a CEO. Entry of vacancies is competitive. After search and
matching, the period ends and another period starts.
The matching process is modeled as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Denote by  the
number of vacancies and by  the number of searching CEOs at the search/matching stage of a
period. The total number of new matches is given by the matching function( ) = (+).10
Denote job market tightness by  = , the matching probability of a searching CEO by  ≡
 ( ) , and the matching probability of a vacancy by  ≡ ( ). We have
 = 1 (1 + ) and  =  (1 + ) = 1− .
These expressions reflect the intuitive property that, when there are more searching CEOs per
vacancy, the matching probability is lower for a searching CEO and higher for a vacancy. Each
CEO or firm takes the tightness and matching probabilities as given, because these characteristics
depend only on the aggregate numbers of vacancies and searching CEOs.
B. Decisions of Individual CEOs and Firms
In each period, decisions are made in the following order: firms choose contracts, CEOs
choose whether to quit or stay, and in the case CEOs stay, they choose the level of eﬀort to exert.
We analyze these decisions recursively in this subsection. In making their decisions, an individual
firm or CEO takes other firms’ and CEOs’ choices as given. Also, because a contract is assumed
to be a sequence of one-period contracts, individuals take as given future contracts that aﬀect
the current period’s choices only through the future value functions.
We first examine the optimal choice of eﬀort by a CEO who has chosen to stay with the
firm in the current period. Given the contract  = ( ) and the realizations of ( ), the CEO
chooses eﬀort  to maximize utility ( ), where  = + (  ). Under the specified forms
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of  and , the optimal choice of eﬀort is given by the following first-order condition:
∗ = ∗(  ) ≡ 12 (2)
As expected, optimal eﬀort decreases in the eﬀort-aversion parameter , increases in PPS, and is
independent of the base wage. In addition, because eﬀort and the shocks are multiplicative in the
profit function, higher shocks induce higher eﬀort. Given any contract  and the induced eﬀort
∗, we denote profit, the CEO’s income, and the CEO’s utility, respectively, as follows:
∗ = ∗(  ) ≡ (∗(  )  ) = 2,
∗ = ∗(  ) ≡ + ∗ = + 22,
∗ = ∗(  ) ≡ + 1222.
(3)
Next, we examine a CEO’s quitting decision after observing . If the CEO chooses to quit,
he becomes unmatched. The value of this unmatched CEO is the same as that of a CEO who
is unemployed at the beginning of the period, which is denoted  . If the CEO chooses to stay
with the firm, his utility in the current period is E(∗), where E denotes the expectation over
. In addition, the CEO will start the next period as matched, the value of which is denoted by
+1, where the subscript +1 indicates the next period. The CEO accepts the contract if and
only if E(∗) + +1 ≥ , where  ∈ (0 1) is the discount factor. We write this acceptance
condition as
E[∗(  )] ≥  ≡  − +1. (4)
Let us call  the CEO’s (eﬀective) outside option for the current period. We substitute ∗ from
(3) and express (4) as a cutoﬀ rule on the idiosyncratic shock . That is, the CEO accepts the
contract if and only if the realization of  satisfies  ≥ ¯, where the cutoﬀ ratio  is
( ) ≡ 2[− E()]¯E(22) . (5)
We keep  and 2 inside the expectation operator E because in principle these terms can be
contingent on . As expected, the cutoﬀ is higher and quitting is more likely if the CEO’s
eﬀective outside option for the period is higher. Also, a more generous base wage and a higher
PPS both reduce the cutoﬀ and make the CEO less likely to quit, provided   0.
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Let us compute the value function of a CEO. If a CEO enters a period as matched, the value
function is . If the CEO separates from the firm, either exogenously or endogenously, the
CEO obtains the value  . If the CEO is not separated from the firm in the current period,
the additional value above  that the CEO obtains is ∗ + +1 −  = ∗ − . Because the
CEO works for the firm if and only if he is not separated from the firm exogenously and if the




E[∗(  )−] 1() (6)
The integral over  reflects the fact that  is not realized when  is measured. If a CEO enters
a period as unmatched, he receives utility  and starts searching. With probability , the CEO
finds a match at the end of the period, in which case the CEO enters the next period as a matched
CEO whose discounted value is +1. With probability 1− , the CEO fails to find a match,
in which case the CEO’s discounted value is +1. Thus,  obeys
 = ++1+(1−)+1 (7)
Now we examine a firm’s contract oﬀer and value function. Let  and  denote the value of
a firm that enters the period with and without a CEO, respectively. Denote by  =  − +1
a firm’s (eﬀective) outside option for the period. We derive  similarly to . For a firm
that starts the period with a CEO, the firm may lose the CEO through exogenous separation or
endogenous quits in the period, in which case the firm’s value is  . If the CEO stays, the firm
obtains net profit in the current period, ∗ −∗, and the discounted value in the future, +1.
The additional value above  is ∗ − ∗ + +1 −  = ∗ −∗ −  . Thus,  obeys
 =  + (1− )max
Z ¯
¯()
E [∗(  )− ∗(  )−  ] 1 () . (8)
We denote the optimal contract for the maximization problem in (8) as ∗(  ) to emphasize its
potential dependence on the two sides’ outside options ( ) and the aggregate shock. Notice that
(8) incorporates the CEO’s participation decision through the cutoﬀ rule ( ) and incentive
compatibility of the eﬀort choice through ∗(  ), which is embedded in (∗ ∗).
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The value of a firm with a vacant CEO position,  , can be computed similarly to  . The
firm incurs a cost  to recruit in the period. With probability , the firm will get a match in the
period, in which case the firm’s value will be +1. With probability 1− , the firm will fail to
get a match in the period, in which case the firm’s value will be +1. Thus,
 = − +  [+1 + (1− )+1]  (9)
C. Definition of a Market Equilibrium
Because the outside options depend on the matching probabilities, which are functions
of market tightness, we need to determine the number of searching CEOs, , and the number of
firms with vacant CEO positions, . These numbers are measured immediately before the search
process starts (see Figure 1). Free entry of vacancies determines . To determine , we compute
the change in the number of searching CEOs between the beginning of the search stages in the
current and next periods, +1−. In the current period, the number of new matches created and
hence the flow out of the group of searching CEOs is , where  is the matching probability for
a searching CEO. Exogenous separation and endogenous quits in the next period generate the
flow into the group of searching CEOs. This inflow is (1 −  + )[ + (1 − )1(¯+1)], where
1 −  +  measures the number of CEOs in matches at the beginning of the next period and
+(1−)1(¯+1) measures the probability with which a matched CEO will become unemployed
through exogenous separation and endogenous quits in the next period. Thus,
+1− = (1−+)[+(1−)1(¯+1)]− (10)
Notice that the number of firms is endogenously determined as  + 1− , where  is the number
of firms that are searching for CEOs and (1− ) is the number of CEO-staﬀed firms.
We define an equilibrium as follows. A stationary and symmetric market equilibrium consists
of an individual firm’s contract ∗(  ), an individual CEO’s quitting rule ( ) and eﬀort
rule ∗(  ), other firms’ contracts ˜ = (˜ ˜), other CEOs’ choices (˜ ˜∗), value functions
(    ), the implied eﬀective outside options ( ), and the numbers of searching CEOs
and searching firms, ( ), such that the following requirements are satisfied:
(i) given any ( ), a CEO’s decision rules ∗(  ) and ( ) satisfy (2) and (5);
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(ii) given any ( ), a firm’s contract ∗(  ) solves the maximization problem in (8);
(iii) the value functions satisfy (6), (7), (8), and (9), while the eﬀective outside options are given
as  =  − +1 and  =  − +1;
(iv) symmetry:  = ˜ and ( ∗) = (˜ ˜∗);
(v) the number of searching CEOs, , obeys the dynamics in (10);
(vi) competitive entry of vacancies:  is such that the net value of creating a vacancy is  = 0;
and
(vii) stationarity: +1 = , +1 =  , +1 =  , +1 = , and +1 =  .
We focus on a stationary equilibrium because the economy described in Section I.A is sta-
tionary. We focus on a symmetric equilibrium because all CEOs and firms conditional on their
status (employed or unemployed, with or without a CEO, respectively) are ex ante homogeneous.
Note that stationarity and symmetry imply only that the decision rules are time-invariant and
symmetric between individuals/firms in the same status. Since these rules are functions of the
realizations of the shocks, the values of a firm’s or a CEO’s choices can still vary from period to
period as diﬀerent realizations of the shocks make firms or CEOs heterogeneous ex post.
The model presented here diﬀers from a standard static agency model with a single agent-
firm pair along three dimensions: (i) the model distinguishes a firm’s idiosyncratic risk from
systematic risk, as opposed to lumping them together as the firm’s total risk; (ii) a CEO can
choose to quit after privately observing idiosyncratic risk; and (iii) there are contracting interac-
tions/externalities among firms in the market equilibrium that work through endogenous outside
options. In the next section we explore the importance of elements (i) and (ii) by analyzing the
optimal contract under any arbitrarily fixed outside options, ( ). In Section III, we examine
the role of element (iii) and determine the equilibrium.
II. Optimal Contract Under Fixed Outside Options
In this section we determine the optimal contract when the eﬀective outside options
for the current period, ( ), are fixed. We also analyze how the two risks and the quitting
decision aﬀect the optimal contract. Even with fixed ( ), our model diﬀers from a static
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agency model not only in the presence of the two risks and the allowance for quitting, but also in
the admissible region of the outside options. A static model assumes that ( ) are nonnegative.
This assumption is unlikely to be valid in an intertemporal setting because the future value of a
match can exceed the value of breaking up the match, in which case the outside option for the
current period is negative. Specifically, a firm’s outside option for a period,  =  − +1, is
negative because  = 0 by the free-entry condition of vacancies. A CEO’s outside option for
a period,  =  − +1, can also be negative when the discount factor is suﬃciently close to
one. Thus, the case with +   0 is the normal case in the equilibrium. For generality in this
section and for comparison with the literature, we do not restrict the sign of +  .
A. The Optimal Contract
As is well known from standard static agency models in which a firm’s profit is contractible
and the manager’s eﬀort is not, the optimal contract is to set ∗ = 1 for a risk-neutral manager
who does not have limited liability (e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, pp160-162), Holmstrom
(1982), and Murphy (1999, pp27-28)). However, the optimal contract in our setting is very
diﬀerent from this well-known result because the risk-neutral CEO can quit and the idiosyncratic
shock  is not publicly observable, despite the fact that the firm’s profit and the aggregate shock
are contractible.
We now examine the contracting problem in (8) where a firm chooses  = ( ) by anticipating
that the CEO’s cutoﬀ rule for quitting responds to the contract according to ( ). To emphasize
the importance of the quitting choice, we reformulate the contracting problem by using ( ) as
the firm’s choices. That is, the firm chooses  and , leaving the base wage  to ensure that
the cutoﬀ  is consistent with the CEO’s optimal quitting rule ( ). This reformulation,
presented in Appendix A, simplifies the analysis of the optimal contract. To ease exposition,
denote Ω ≡ ¯2E(2) and rewrite the firm’s objective function as [1 − 1(¯)]( ), where
( ) is the firm’s expected surplus over  conditional on retaining the CEO and is defined as
( ) ≡ £2+ (1− )(1 + )¤Ω− (+ ). (11)
PROPOSITION 1: Assume that ( ) are fixed and satisfy 2¯ (3¯ − 1)Ω  +   Ω.
(i) The optimal choices (∗ ∗) are unique and independent of the realization of the aggregate
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shock .
(ii) ∗ and ∗ are interior and satisfy the first-order conditions:





























(iii) An increase in either  or  increases (∗ ∗) and the CEO’s incentive pay ∗∗. A higher
 increases the expected base wage  (∗) but a higher  reduces the expected base wage.
(iv) An increase in either aggregate or idiosyncratic risk ( or ) reduces (∗ ∗) when +  0
and increases (∗ ∗) when  +   0. Also, an increase in either risk increases the CEO’s
incentive pay ∗∗ at  = ∗¯ and reduces the expected base wage  (∗).
The optimal cutoﬀ ratio ∗ is independent of  because a CEO’s quitting decision is made
before observing . The driving force for ∗  1, which is explained below, is a CEO’s option to
quit after privately observing . Because this driving force is independent of the realization of ,
so is the optimal ∗. For ∗ and ∗ to lie in the interior of (0 1), it is necessary and suﬃcient that
( + ) satisfies the bounds in the proposition. These bounds are satisfied by the endogenous
outside options in the equilibrium under certain restrictions on the parameters specified later in
Proposition 2. In fact, these bounds on (+ ) yield 12(1 + ¯)  ∗  1 and ∗ ∈ (¯ 1).
Our result ∗  1 contrasts sharply with the well-known result ∗ = 1 in standard static
agency models for a risk-neutral agent. The diﬀerence is caused by the assumption that  is only
observed by a CEO who can quit. It is easy to see the role of quitting: if a CEO is forbidden to
quit, then it is always optimal for a firm to extract all surplus by setting  = 1 to induce eﬀort.
As for the role of private information about , we first consider the alternative assumption
that  is publicly observable and contractible while a CEO can still quit. In this case, a contract
takes the form (   ) instead of (  ). Moreover, it is optimal for the firm to induce the
CEO to quit if the realization of  is so low that the joint surplus of the match is negative. When
 is high enough to generate a positive joint surplus, the firm will use the contract to squeeze the
14
CEO’s expected surplus over  to zero. That is, (4) holds with equality for such , which yields
E () =  − 2E(22). Then, for such , after substituting (∗ ∗) from (3) and E (), we
obtain the firm’s expected surplus as








For each pair ( ), the derivative of the firm’s expected surplus with respect to (   ) is
 [1 − (   )]2, which is strictly positive for all   1. Thus, when  is contractible, the
optimal PPS is (   ) = 1 for all  high enough to make it worthwhile for the firm to keep
the CEO. With ∗ = 1, the firm makes the CEO’s incentive in the eﬀort choice perfectly aligned
with the goal of maximizing the total expected surplus of the match. Notice that this contract
with ∗ = 1 requires the expected base wage over  to vary with the idiosyncratic shock in the
form that E () = − ¯Ω. That is, when  is high, the firm rewards the CEO through incentive
pay by giving  = 1, but at the same time reduces the base wage. In fact, the firm adjusts the
CEO’s base wage conditional on  to the extent that the CEO’s value in the period’s match is
equal to the eﬀective outside option for the period.
Now we return to the model where  is the CEO’s private information. In this case, the
incentive contract cannot be contingent on the realization of . Thus, the firm cannot squeeze
the CEO’s expected surplus to zero by adjusting the base wage. Rather, the CEO is shielded
from the negative surplus in the case   ∗¯ by quitting. For all   ∗¯, the CEO’s expected
surplus, E(∗ − ), is strictly positive and increases with the size of the “pie” generated by a
higher . Since the firm cannot condition the base wage on , the only way to get a share of this
larger pie is to set PPS below one.11
When ∗  1, the optimal PPS interacts with the quitting decision and is aﬀected by the two
risks, as stated in parts (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 1 and explained in the next two subsections.
B. The Interactions between The Optimal PPS and The Quitting Decision
As explained immediately before Proposition 1, the optimal choices (∗ ∗) maximize
a firm’s expected surplus, [1 − 1(¯)]( ). The first-order conditions are stated in (12) and
depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2 is here.
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In each panel, the straight line depicts the first-order condition of ∗, the curve depicts the first
order condition of ∗, and the intersection of the two is the optimal pair (∗ ∗). The dotted
curve represents the first-order condition of ∗ with a higher  or  , relative to the solid curve.
For any given , the first-order condition of PPS, ∗, gives a positive relationship between
the optimal PPS and the cutoﬀ. To explain this relationship, we start with the fact that for any
given , the retention probability does not depend on . Thus, the optimal PPS maximizes the
firm’s surplus conditional on retention, ( ), given by (11). At the optimal PPS, the marginal
benefit of  to the conditional surplus is zero and diminishing. Moreover, the marginal benefit of
 is increasing in , that is,  and  are complementary with each other in the conditional surplus.
As a result, when the cutoﬀ is higher, the marginal benefit of PPS to the conditional surplus is
amplified, in which case a higher PPS is optimal in order to restore the marginal benefit of PPS
to zero. This gives the positive relationship between  and . The reason for the complementarity
between  and  is that a higher cutoﬀmeans that the idiosyncratic shock conditional on retention
of the CEO is higher in the first-order stochastic dominance. In this case, an increase in the CEO’s
eﬀort induced by a higher PPS increases the firm’s profit by a larger amount, because eﬀort and
the idiosyncratic shock are multiplicative in the profit function.
In contrast to PPS, the cutoﬀ aﬀects both the retention probability and the firm’s conditional
surplus. A higher cutoﬀ reduces the retention probability. At the same time, it improves the
distribution of the idiosyncratic shock conditional on retention and hence increases the firm’s
conditional surplus. For any given , the optimal cutoﬀ for retention, ∗, achieves the optimal
trade-oﬀ between the retention probability and the conditional surplus by maximizing the firm’s
expected surplus, [1 −  (¯)]( ). The resulting relationship between PPS and the cutoﬀ is
positive when +  0 and negative when +  0. That is, when  increases, the net marginal
eﬀect of  on the firm’s expected surplus increases if and only if +  0, in which case a higher
cutoﬀ is needed to maintain the net marginal eﬀect of  at zero. To explain this result, note that
PPS aﬀects the trade-oﬀ between the marginal eﬀects of  on the conditional surplus and the
retention probability. A higher PPS increases the marginal benefit of  to the conditional surplus,
because  and  are complementary with each other in the conditional surplus. This eﬀect of 
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is weighted by the retention probability because the eﬀect is operative only when the firm can
retain the CEO. On the cost side, a higher  aﬀects the level of the conditional surplus that will
be lost when the retention probability falls with . This cost eﬀect is ambiguous. Overall, when 
increases, the eﬀect on the marginal benefit of  dominates the eﬀect on the marginal cost of  if
and only if the retention probability is suﬃciently large to give the first eﬀect a suﬃciently high
weight. In turn, for the retention probability to be suﬃciently high, the sum of the two sides’
eﬀective outside options must be lower than a critical level. This critical level of ( + ) turns
out to be zero.
C. The Eﬀects of The Outside Options and The Two Risks
We now explain the last two parts of Proposition 1. Part (iii) describes the eﬀect of the
outside options on the optimal contract. Higher outside options increase the optimal contract
(∗ ∗) through the sum ( + ), as shown in (13). This is also apparent in both panels of
Figure 2, where an increase in (+ ) shifts up the solid curve FOC to the dotted curve while
leaving FOC intact, resulting in a higher optimal PPS and a higher cutoﬀ. Although outside
options exert their impacts as a sum, intuition can be obtained by examining the eﬀects of the
two components separately. Let us start with the cutoﬀ. A higher outside option for a CEO
reduces the CEO’s likelihood to stay, which induces an increase in the cutoﬀ. Also, a higher
outside option for a firm raises the profit expectation for an existing match, and a higher profit
necessitates a higher idiosyncratic shock conditional on the shock being above the cutoﬀ, which
in turns calls for a higher cutoﬀ. Given the above insights, the positive relation between PPS
and the outside options can be easily understood since, as shown in the last section, PPS and the
cutoﬀ are complementary.
Part (iv) of Proposition 1 states how risks impact the optimal contract (∗ ∗), where risk
is defined as the variance of the associated shock with the mean fixed. Aside from the outside
options (+), Ω is the only term that enters the optimal contract as shown in (13). Thus, with
fixed outside options, the two risks exert their impact on optimal contracts exclusively through
Ω. An increase in idiosyncratic risk  increases Ω directly, and an increase in systematic risk 
increases Ω by increasing the term E(2). When Ω increases, the line FOC in Figure 2 remains
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unchanged while the solid curve FOC shifts to the dotted curve. Therefore, an increase in either
risk reduces (∗ ∗) when +   0 and increases (∗ ∗) when +   0.
To facilitate deeper understanding of the above eﬀects, let us trace a cause-eﬀect link from
risks to profits and then from profits to optimal contracts, notwithstanding that the equilibrium
is solved simultaneously. To begin, for any given contract, an increase in either risk increases the
firm’s conditional surplus. Consider first an increase in aggregate risk. Insofar as the conditional
surplus function in (11) depends positively on E(2) via Ω and higher aggregate risk leads to
a higher E(2), an increase in aggregate risk leads to higher profit. Since the overall size of
the “pie” has increased, the firm’s conditional surplus would increase under any given contract.
Consider next an increase in idiosyncratic risk. For any given contract, higher idiosyncratic risk
increases the firm’s conditional surplus by increasing the average value of  conditional on the
CEO’s acceptance of the match. Specifically, because the CEO stays only if  ≥ ∗¯, the firm’s
profit behaves like a call option written on idiosyncratic shock, with a strike price set to the
reservation value ∗¯. Higher idiosyncratic risk widens the interval of possible realizations of 
on both sides of the mean. However, the widening of the interval of  on the left side of the
mean has no impact on the firm’s profit since the CEO quits if the realization is below ∗¯. In
contrast, the widening of the interval of  on the right side of the mean increases the firm’s profit
and conditional surplus.
Having established the positive link from the risks to a firm’s conditional surplus, we now link
the latter to the optimal contract. When a firm’s conditional surplus increases with either risk,
the firm must re-optimize to restore the optimal trade-oﬀ between the retention probability and
the conditional surplus. The required adjustments in (∗ ∗) depend on (+), the sign of which
dictates whether the firm is more concerned with the retention probability or the conditional
surplus, as alluded to above. When +   0, the cutoﬀ is relatively high and the firm is more
concerned about the retention probability. In this case, it is optimal for the firm to increase the
retention probability by inducing the cutoﬀ ∗ to fall. The opposite is true when +   0. In
both cases, PPS adjusts in the same direction as ∗ due to their complementarity in the firm’s
conditional surplus. Hence, a higher conditional surplus leads to higher ∗ and ∗. Juxtaposing
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the two links, we obtain that an increase in either idiosyncratic risk or systematic risk will increase
(∗ ∗) when +   0 and decrease (∗ ∗) when +   0.
Finally, to understand the second claim in part (iv) of Proposition 1, we need to realize that,
to induce eﬀort, the firm uses part of the increase in profit to increase the CEO’s incentive pay.
Thus, even when ∗ and ∗ fall in the case  +   0, the CEO’s incentive pay at  =  still
increases with Ω. Because the total expected pay to the CEO is fixed at , the increase in the
incentive pay must be accompanied by a fall in the expected base wage.
At this point, we would like to point out two key diﬀerences between our model and the
standard static agency models with a risk-averse agent (Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, pp160-
162), and Murphy (1999, pp27-28)). First, the optimal contract in our model responds to changes
in risks because of the optimal trade-oﬀ between the retention probability and conditional surplus,
not because of risk aversion. In contrast, in the static agency models, PPS falls with increased risks
because the agent is risk averse.12 Second, standard models presume that the outside options are
always nonnegative, a stipulation unlikely to be valid in an intertemporal setting with suﬃciently
patient players. When the joint outside option is negative, our analysis in this section shows that
the risks can increase PPS.
III. Contracting Externalities and Properties of the Market Equilibrium
This section explains contracting externalities and describes the market equilibrium. We
first show how individual firms’ choices generate contracting externalities via eﬀective outside
options and matching probabilities. We then state Proposition 2 and show that the two risks
aﬀect the optimal contract diﬀerently in equilibrium, in contrast to the result with fixed outside
options. These equilibrium properties form the main hypotheses for our empirical tests in Section
IV.
Contracting externalities arise because the outside options ( ) and the matching rates
( ) are endogenous in equilibrium but are taken as given by individuals. To understand these
externalities, we show how the outside options ( ) respond to . To this end, suppose that all
firms choose a contract  = ( ). Given the contract  and the induced cutoﬀ , we can derive
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the following equations (see Appendix B):
 =  − Ω2(1− )2,  = − = −2Ω(1− )2, (14)
 = [2Ω(1− )2], where  ≡ (1− )¯(
√
3). (15)
The above equations reveal two externalities: (i) individual firms and CEOs ignore the equilibrium
relationship between the matching probability and the contract; (ii) individual firms and CEOs
ignore the eﬀect of their own contract on the outside options of other firm-CEO pairs.
The first externality arises because of the dependence of the matching probability on the
contracts through competitive entry of vacancies. To see how the matching probability and the
contract component  interact, we note that free entry of vacancies requires  = ( ), which
increases in  since  is a decreasing function of  (see (14)). When the value of a CEO-staﬀed
firm falls with PPS, fewer vacancies are created in order for each vacancy to break even. This
equilibrium response of  to  reduces a searching CEO’s matching probability  = 1 −  and
hence reduces a CEO’s outside option  (see (14)).
The second externality stems from the fact that one firm’s contract directly aﬀects other
managers’ outside options. This externality appears in (14): for a given matching probability
, the outside options  and  increase in , provided  = 2 − 1  0. To see this, recall that
when a firm chooses a higher PPS, the firm also increases the cutoﬀ  and reduces the expected
base wage. For any   12, the loss to a CEO from the reduction in the expected base wage
outweighs the gain from the increased PPS, causing an employed CEO’s expected surplus in the
current period to fall. The falling expected surplus increases the CEO’s desire to quit and search.
Thus, for a given , competition among firms intensifies in a bid to retain their CEOs, which
reduces the value of a CEO-staﬀed firm. Thus, the value of a searching firm relative to the value
of a matched firm increases.
Simple algebra reveals that, as far as a CEO’s outside option is concerned, the consequence of
the first externality dominates the second one, resulting in an overall negative relation between
PPS and a CEO’s outside option.
Because of these externalities, the properties of PPS in the equilibrium diﬀer from those
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under fixed outside options. Before stating these properties, let us denote the ratio of a CEO’s
total expected pay to firm value as , where firm value is  and total expected pay is
(1− ) R ¯∗¯ E(∗ + ∗∗)1(). The following proposition is proven in Appendix B:
PROPOSITION 2: A unique market equilibrium exists in a non-empty region of the parameters
( ) specified in Appendix B. Moreover, the equilibrium PPS, the cutoﬀ ∗, and the
matching probability  are all interior. Assuming   1[2(1 − )], the equilibrium has the
following properties:
(i) equilibrium PPS decreases with  and ;
(ii) equilibrium PPS increases with idiosyncratic risk  if and only if ∗  2 ∈ (23 1), where
2 is defined by (4); and
(iii) the pay-size ratio  is 2∗−11−∗ + (1 − ∗), decreases with  and , and increases
with idiosyncratic risk  if and only if ∗  3 ∈ (¯ 23), where 3 is defined by (5).
Let us elaborate on the restrictions on the parameters ( ) for an interior equilibrium
to exist (see (3) in Appendix B for the precise restrictions).13 First, the hiring cost  should
not be very high. If  is very high, the vacancy-filling probability must be one for a firm to
create a vacancy. In this case, a CEO’s job-finding probability is zero. Second, the ratio 
should not be too high. If  is very high, idiosyncratic risk is low relative to the mean, in
which case a CEO never quits. Third, the benefit to a searching CEO should be bounded below
and above. If this benefit is very low, there is no gain for a CEO to quit one job and search for
another. If this benefit is very high, quitting happens often. In this case, a firm needs to set PPS
to be very high, which is not profitable. In addition, we impose the assumption   1[2(1− )]
to simplify the algebra. This assumption is easily satisfied when the exogenous separation rate 
is small. For example, when  = 0, the assumption requires only that   12.
We now turn to parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2, which describe how the two risks aﬀect the
equilibrium PPS. First, an increase in  or  always reduces the equilibrium PPS, while it does
so under the partial equilibrium only when the joint outside option value is positive. Second, the
two risks can aﬀect the equilibrium PPS in opposite directions. In particular, an increase in 
increases PPS when PPS is low, while  always reduces the equilibrium PPS. In contrast, in the
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partial equilibrium with fixed outside options, the two risks always aﬀect PPS in the same way.
These diﬀerences demonstrate in a concrete way the importance of the market equilibrium. Also,
the finding of opposite eﬀects of the two risks on PPS contrasts with the agency literature with
a single agent-firm pair, where the two risks both reduce PPS.
To shed light why the two risks can aﬀect the equilibrium PPS in opposite directions, we
explain how these risks aﬀect the outside options. To this end, we combine the two externalities




where  is stated in (15). For any given , the joint outside option value, +  , depends on 
entirely through Ω = ¯2E(2) and on  entirely through ¯2, which enters in Ω. The higher
 or , the higher Ω. An increase in  reduces ¯2, even after considering the relationship
¯ =  + 
√
3. Thus, for a given , +  decreases in  and increases in .
It is intuitive that the two risks aﬀect the outside options in opposite directions. As is well
known in search theory, the return to search is a convex function of the underlying match value
because the return is truncated at zero. That is, a match with a high value is accepted, but a
match with a low value is rejected, in which case a searcher retains the value of search. Convexity
implies that the return to search increases when match value is more dispersed. An increase in
 increases dispersion in match value and hence increases the return to search relative to staying
in a match for both the CEO and the firm. In contrast, an increase in  aﬀects all matches in
the same way and reduces the return to search relative to staying in the existing match.
Because of their diﬀerent impacts on outside options, the two risks can aﬀect the equilibrium
PPS in opposite directions. To see this, recall from Proposition 1 that an increase in the joint
outside option value ( + ) boosts PPS. When aggregate risk increases, the ratio ( + )Ω
falls and, by (13), the equilibrium PPS falls. When idiosyncratic risk increases, the joint outside
option value goes up, which increases PPS. In addition, for any given joint outside option value,
an increase in idiosyncratic risk has the direct eﬀect of increasing PPS if and only if the joint
outside option value is negative. The overall eﬀect of a higher  on the equilibrium PPS is
positive if +   0 or if PPS itself is not too high. Specifically, since (+ )  0 if and only if
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∗  23 (see (13)), an increase in  increases PPS if and only if ∗  2 ∈ (23 1) (see Appendix
B for details). The above property reveals that the response of the equilibrium PPS to the risks
is often dictated by outside options’ response to the risks. As such, a partial equilibrium model
is prone to erroneous conclusions about risks’ impact on PPS simply due to its fixing outside
options.
At this point, we compare our results to those in Jin (2002) and Garvey and Milbourn (2003),
who study incentive contracts in a static partial equilibrium setting in which idiosyncratic and
systematic risks are explicitly modeled. In their static setting, the joint outside option value is
assumed to be positive since the CEO has a positive reservation utility while the principal has
zero reservation value. Jin (2002) shows that the optimal ∗ decreases with firm-specific risk but
is not aﬀected by market risk when the CEO can trade the market. When the CEO cannot trade
the market, the eﬀect of systematic risk is indeterministic. Garvey and Milbourn (2003) show
that the optimal ∗ decreases with firm-specific risk, while it decreases with market risk when
hedging is costly or is not aﬀected by costless hedging. Since we do not explicitly model the
CEO’s optimal portfolio or hedging decision, it is impossible to compare the eﬀect of systematic
risk on PPS in our model to that in Jin (2002) and Garvey and Milbourn (2003). We thus focus
comparison on the eﬀect of idiosyncratic risk on PPS.
The common conclusion of the two previous studies is that PPS decreases with idiosyncratic
risk. Such a result is consistent with the partial equilibrium analysis when the joint outside
option value is positive (see part (iv) of Proposition 1). However, in a dynamic equilibrium
setting such as our model, the joint outside option value can be positive or negative. When the
joint outside option value is negative, PPS increases with idiosyncratic risk. More importantly,
our market equilibrium analysis shows that the equilibrium PPS increases with idiosyncratic risk
due to contracting externalities. The comparison between our model and these two studies further
indicates that the equilibrium analysis imposes stronger discipline on the relationship between
idiosyncratic risk and PPS, which serves as proper guidance for empirical tests.
The properties of the pay-size ratio described in part (iii) of Proposition 2 follow from the
equilibrium eﬀects of the two risks on PPS. When  increases, the equilibrium PPS decreases
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and the retention probability increases, as apparent in (13). Both responses increase a firm’s
expected value. A CEO’s total expected pay may also increase, but it increases by a smaller
proportion because the CEO’s profit-sharing ratio is reduced. Overall, the pay-size ratio falls
with . In contrast, an increase in  can increase the pay-size ratio by increasing PPS and
incentive pay. Because an increase in  increases PPS only when PPS is relatively small, not
surprisingly it increases the pay-size ratio only when PPS is relatively small.
IV. Empirical Analysis
To facilitate the empirical analyses, let us summarize. We construct a theoretical model
to integrate an agency problem in CEO compensation with search theory and analyze the market
equilibrium with many firms and CEOs. Each firm oﬀers an incentive contract to the CEO that
achieves the optimal trade-oﬀ between the probability of retaining the CEO and expected profit
conditional on retention. This trade-oﬀ implies that the optimal PPS is below one, despite CEOs
being risk neutral. More importantly, the search process endogenously determines CEOs’ and
firms’ outside options, which reflect the externalities in the market equilibrium. The externalities
lead to novel eﬀects of the risks on incentive contracts. While an increase in idiosyncratic risk
boosts search by widening dispersion in match value, an increase in aggregate risk dampens
search by compressing dispersion in match value. As a result, idiosyncratic risk increases PPS
when PPS is not too large, but aggregate risk always reduces PPS. In addition, the two risks
aﬀect the pay-size ratio diﬀerently. The diﬀerent eﬀects of the two risks on PPS and the pay-size
ratio arise from the externalities, which are unique to the market equilibrium with search. When
the outside options are fixed at positive levels as in the agency literature, the two risks have the
same qualitative impact on PPS, contrary to our equilibrium predictions.
The objective of our empirical analyses is three-fold: (i) to evaluate our model’s predictions
on PPS; (ii) to provide an explanation for the mixed evidence on the relationship between firm
risks and PPS; and (iii) to provide new evidence on the relative growth between CEO pay and
firm size. Because the empirical PPS value is rather small, the condition ∗  3 in Proposition
2 is easily satisfied. In this case, our model yields the following testable predictions:
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PREDICTION 1: PPS, , decreases with a firm’s systematic risk and increases with the firm’s
idiosyncratic risk.
PREDICTION 2: The relative growth of total pay to firm size, , decreases with a firm’s
systematic risk and increases with the firm’s idiosyncratic risk.
A. Data and Variable Definitions
CEO compensation data are retrieved from ExecuComp for the period 1992 to 2009. Firm
characteristics and returns are obtained from COMPUSTAT and CRSP. To follow the tradition
of this literature (e.g., Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006)), we exclude financial and utility firms
(SIC codes 6000 to 6999 and 4900 to 4999, respectively). We exclude observations for which
there are fewer than 48 months of stock return data, as in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999). We
also exclude firm-years that experienced CEO turnover because the reported compensation for
those years covers only a portion of the year, making comparison across years diﬃcult. Our final
sample consists of 12,890 firm-years for 1,890 firms and 3,181 CEOs.
We identify empirical measures for PPS and . A typical compensation package in-
cludes salary, bonus, and restricted stock and option grants (see Murphy (1999)).14 Since most
incentive payments are related to equities, we focus on PPS related to stock and option grants.
Following Jensen and Murphy (1990), we define PPS as the change in the value of CEO pay with
respect to a $1 000 change in shareholder wealth. We use the “ex-ante” PPS measure, which is
the implied change in CEO wealth for a $1 000 change in firm value. The ex-ante PPS measure
is computed based on the number of stock and option grants, and is consistent with the definition
of  in our model and more convenient for empirical tests. This approach is used by Core and
Guay (1999), Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), and Jin (2002).
For completeness, we calculate two versions of PPS. The first, called “new equity incentives,”
is based on the stock and option grants for the current year, which are straightforward to obtain
from ExecuComp data set. The second, called “total equity incentives,” is computed from the
accumulated stock and option grants up to the current year. The calculation of total equity
incentives is complicated by the fact that details on past option grants only became available
after 2006. For years prior to 2006, researchers have used the one-year approximation method
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developed by Core and Guay (2002a) to estimate the incentive level of past option grants. These
authors show that the one-year approximation method generates very similar estimates as using
the actual details of option grants. For robustness, we calculate total equity incentives in two
ways. First, to take advantage of the more detailed compensation data post-2006, we use the full
details of option grants to calculate the exact total equity incentives after 2006 but use the one-
year approximation method prior to 2006. Second, we calculate total equity incentives using the
one-year approximation method for the whole sample period. The latter removes the potential
impact of the data change on our empirical results. Consistent with Core and Guay (2002a), we
find that the two versions of total equity incentives for the period 2006 to 2009 are very close to
each other, with a high correlation of 0.983.
Total compensation is taken as flow compensation (TDC1), which consists of salary, bonus,
other annual short-term compensation, total value of restricted stock granted, total value of
stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and all other long-term
compensation. We calculate  as the ratio between annual total compensation and firm
size, where firm size is proxied by either sales, market capitalization, or book assets.
Next, we formulate the two major explanatory variables: a firm’s systematic risk and idio-
syncratic risk. A firm’s risk is proxied by the volatility of its stock returns, an approach adopted
by many authors such as Core and Guay (1999, 2002a), Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), and
Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Under this approach, a firm’s total risk is the volatility of stock re-
turns over the 60 months prior to the fiscal year. The market model is used to obtain the firm’s
beta using the same set of monthly return data. A firm’s systematic risk is equal to the firm’s
beta multiplied by stock market risk, while the firm’s idiosyncratic risk is the square-root of total
return variance minus systematic return variance.
It is worth noting that in contrast to Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), Jin (2002), and Garvey
and Milbourn (2003), we do not use the volatility of dollar returns as our risk measure. These
authors use dollar risk measures because a firm’s profit in their static models is the sum of CEO
eﬀort and the noise term, which forces profits and the volatility of the noise term to be measured
in the same units. One drawback of these dollar risk measures is the high correlation between
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systematic risks and idiosyncratic risks. This correlation is as high as 0.906 for our sample. Such
a high correlation creates multicollinearity problems in the regressions that make it diﬃcult to
disentangle the eﬀects of the two risks. Furthermore, the dollar risk measures are highly correlated
with firm size, an important control variable used in the regression. For example, the correlation
between dollar idiosyncratic (systematic) risk and market capitalization is 0.847 (0.759) for our
sample. These high correlations also create multicollinearity problems in the regressions that
make it diﬃcult to separate the eﬀects of the risks from the eﬀect of firm size. Therefore, as
argued by Core and Guay (2002b), the dollar risk measures can be viewed as noisy proxies for
firm size and hence are not appropriate for capturing firm risks. Our model enables us to avoid
these problems. In our model, a firm’s profit is the product (instead of the sum) of the aggregate
shock, the firm-specific shock, and CEO eﬀort. Even if the CEO’s eﬀort is measured in dollars, the
aggregate shock and the match-specific shock can be measured in other units without violating
consistency. We use return volatilities as risk measures, which are consistent with our model and
have relatively low correlations with other explanatory variables.
The aggregate shock in our model is an important factor in determining the compensation
contract. It includes all changes common to the industry that aﬀect the marginal contribution
of a CEO’s eﬀort to firm profit. Aggregate shocks to total factor productivity, such as the
one measured by the Solow residual, are part but not the only part of this aggregate shock.
For example, industry-wide changes in inputs of physical capital, energy, and regular (non-CEO)
labor can all change the marginal contribution of a CEO’s eﬀort to firm profit. For this reason, we
use four broad measures as proxies for the aggregate state: industry sales, GDP, the commercial
paper spread, and the credit spread. Intuitively, high growth in industry sales represents a healthy
business environment for that industry while high GDP growth indicates a booming economy.
The use of the commercial paper spread is based on Bernanke and Blinder (1992), who suggest
that a high commercial paper spread at the beginning of the year signals a bad economy since this
measure tends to rise sharply during credit crunches. For ease of interpretation of the regression
results, we use the negative lagged commercial paper spread as a proxy for aggregate shocks. Use
of the negative credit spread is based on Gilchrist, Yankov, and Zakrajsek (2009) and Gomes and
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Schmid (2010).15 Annual growth in industry sales is computed from COMPUSTAT while annual
GDP growth is retrieved from the website of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The commercial
paper spread is the diﬀerence between the three-month commercial paper rate and the T-bill rate
(see Friedman and Kuttner (1993) and Korajczyk and Levy (2003)), and the credit spread is the
diﬀerence between the average yields of Baa bonds and Aaa bonds. Both rates are obtained from
the Federal Reserve Board.
To control for additional heterogeneity in the data but not in our model, we include other
variables. Following Milbourn (2003) and Garvey and Milbourn (2003), we control for the CEO’s
age and tenure, and a firm’s size and growth. Tenure is defined as the number of years a person
has been CEO of a firm. Firm growth is proxied by the firm’s sales growth or Tobin’s q, while
its size is proxied by its sales, book assets, or market capitalization. Jensen (1986) argues that
equity incentives can mitigate the agency problem caused by high free cash flow. Thus, following
Core and Guay (1999) we measure a firm’s free cash flow as operating cash flow minus dividends
over assets. Also, we follow Jin (2002) to control for capital over sales, research and development
(R&D) expense over capital, advertising expense over capital, investment over capital, and dummy
variables for missing observations on R&D and advertising expenses. These variables are intended
to capture cross-sectional diﬀerences in how managerial eﬀort aﬀects firm value.16
We use two measures to combat the potential undue eﬀect of outliers existing in the highly
skewed compensation data. First, we winsorize the compensation data and firm characteristics at
the 1% and 99% levels, a standard procedure used in the compensation literature (e.g., Garvey
and Milbourn (2006), and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006)). Second, following Aggarwal and
Samwick (1999), in addition to OLS regressions, we run median regressions to further reduce the
potential impact of outliers.
Table I provides summary statistics for the winsorized compensation data as well as CEO
and firm characteristics, and unwinsorized macroeconomic proxies. All monetary variables are
inflation adjusted using 2005 dollars. As a result, industry sales growth and GDP growth are in
real terms.
Table I is here.
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The average annual salary for a CEO is about $727,000, slightly higher than the average
annual bonus of $635,000. However, the median annual salary of $672,000 is double the median
bonus of $324,000, indicating that bonuses are more skewed toward the high end. Similar patterns
of skewness exist in equity-related pay and total pay. In particular, the average equity-related
pay and total compensation are $3,362,000 and $4,787,000, respectively, which are roughly twice
the corresponding median values. It is worth noting that the average equity-related pay is more
than four times the average annual salary, indicating that a CEO derives his pay mainly from
equity-related compensation. The average new equity incentive granted in a fiscal year is $1.96 per
$1,000 change in shareholder wealth, compared to the average accumulated total equity incentive
of $28.37. The average CEO is about 55 years old and stays with a firm approximately eight
years. The youngest CEO is 39 years old while the oldest is 75. The longest tenure is 37 years
while the shortest job duration is six months.
Panel B of Table I indicates that firms in the sample are skewed toward large size. In par-
ticular, the average market capitalization is $6,845 million, almost five times the median value
of $1,486 million; the average sales revenue is $4,993 million, almost four times the median sales
of $1,398 million. The average firm’s total risk represented by return volatility is 43%, which
is slightly higher than the median 38%. The average systematic risk is 15%, about one-third of
average total risk.
During the period 1992 to 2009, the growth rate of industry sales ranges from -43% to 61%,
with a mean and median of 4%. The average GDP growth rate is 3%, with a standard deviation
of 2%, indicating significant fluctuation. The commercial paper spread and credit spread are even
more volatile, with a standard deviation of 17 and 39 basis points, respectively, in comparison
with the corresponding means of 27.72 and 94 basis points.
Table II presents the correlations among the explanatory variables.
Table II is here.
As expected, there is a positive correlation between industry sales growth and GDP growth, and
between the commercial paper spread and the credit spread. Also, the two spreads are negatively
correlated with the two growth series. For example, the credit spread has a correlation of -0.356
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with industry sales growth, and -0.862 with GDP growth. Lastly, the low correlations among
most of explanatory variables reassure the absence of potential multicollinearity problems.
B. Test of Prediction 1: Eﬀects of Idiosyncratic and Systematic Risks on PPS
To test the opposite eﬀects of the idiosyncratic and systematic risks on PPS, we run the
following regression:
 = 1 + 2Firm idiosyncratic risk + 3Firm systematic risk
+ 4Macro proxy+ 5CEO Age+ 6CEO Tenure + 7 log (Firm size)
+8Firm growth+ 9Free cash flow + 10Capital/sales
+ 11R&D/capital + 12R&D missing dummy + 13Advertising/capital
+ 14Advertising missing dummy + 15Investment/capital + 
(17)
where macro proxy represents industry sales growth, GDP growth, the negative lagged commer-
cial paper spread, and the negative credit spread, respectively.17 The two risk measures, Firm
idiosyncratic risk and Firm systematic risk, are computed from the market model as described in
the previous subsection. Regression (17) is run separately for two versions of . The first version
is PPS from new equity grants. The second version is PPS from total equity grants. We refer to
each version as the base case. Furthermore, for each base case, we run four alternative regressions
as robustness checks.
The first robustness test runs (17) with a nonlinear transformation of the two risk measures.
The transformation is performed using the cumulative distribution function approach proposed by
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999). In the second robustness check, we run (17) using risk measures
computed from the Fama-French three-factor model. The last two robustness tests are run to
account for potential endogeneity of firm risks. As pointed out by Tufano (1996) and Coles, Daniel,
and Naveen (2006), endogeneity may exist because executive compensation may aﬀect a firm’s
risk-taking behavior. Therefore, in the third robustness check, we replace an individual firm’s
risk measures with average industry risk measures. This approach is advocated by Jin (2002),
who argues that CEOs are less likely to control for industry risk and thus average industry risk
measures should be a better representation of environmental risk. The last robustness check
involves running a typical instrumental variable regression to account for potential endogeneity
eﬀects, whereby the average industry risk measures are taken as the instrumental variables. Since
there is no standard procedure to run median regressions with instrumental variables, we only
30
perform the last robustness check for OLS regressions.
B.1. The Case for New Equity Incentives
Since the incentive contract in our model is oﬀered to a CEO period by period, it is
natural to test the eﬀects of the two risks on new equity incentives, which is the focus of the
current section. For brevity, we only present results using sales and sales growth to measure firm
size and growth. The results based on our other proxies for firm size and growth are qualitatively
similar.18 Table III presents OLS and median regression results.
Table III is here.
The main findings are as follows. First, consistent with our predictions,  depends positively on
idiosyncratic risk and negatively on systematic risk in all regressions. Coeﬃcients for idiosyn-
cratic risk are all significant at the 1% level while most of the coeﬃcients for systematic risk
are significant at the 1% level. We use results from median regressions to discuss the impact
of a firm’s risks on PPS for new equity incentives. Suppose GDP growth is used as the macro
proxy. An increase of one standard deviation in firms’ idiosyncratic risk (i.e., 19%) increases
new equity incentive pay by $459 237 (= 2029 × 19% × $6 845 million ×1710%1000), while
an increase of one standard deviation in firms’ systematic risk (i.e., 10%) decreases new equity
incentive pay by $98 673 (= 0843× 10%× $6 845 million ×1710%1000). Thus, the impacts of
firms’ idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk on PPS are economically significant.19
Second, to compare our predictions with those of a standard agency model, we rerun (17)
by replacing idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk with the firm total risk. For brevity, we only
report the coeﬃcient and -value for the firm total risk as well as the corresponding 2. The
relationship between PPS and a firm’s total risk is positive and significant at the 1% level for all
regressions. This finding is consistent with the results in Core and Guay (1999) but inconsistent
with the prediction of a standard agency model.
So far, we have shown that our model’s predictions are generally borne out by the empirical
evidence for new equity incentives. We also run four alternative regressions described earlier
as robustness checks. Since regression results are qualitatively similar to those in Table III, for
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brevity we only report coeﬃcients of firm idiosyncratic risk and firm systematic risk in Table IV.
Table IV is here.
Under all four alternative specifications, the results show that firm idiosyncratic risk continues to
exert a positive and significant (at the 1% level) impact on PPS. The results for firm systematic
risk are slightly weaker but the regression coeﬃcients are still significantly negative under most
of the specifications.
B.2. The Case for Total Equity Incentives
While our model is more applicable to new equity incentives, the empirical compensa-
tion literature mostly focuses on cumulative equity grants. Assuming that a firm’s risk level is
relatively stable or highly autocorrelated over time, our predictions of the two risks would also
apply to total equity grants. In this section, we test the eﬀects of the two risks on cumulative
equity grants by running regression (17) for the two versions of total equity incentives described
in Section IV.A. We also perform the four robustness checks for the two versions of total equity
incentives. By and large, the results are qualitatively similar to those for new equity incentives.
For brevity, we only report the coeﬃcients for the two risk measures in Table V.
Table V is here.
Consistent with the results for new equity incentives, firm idiosyncratic risk has a significantly
positive eﬀect while firm systematic risk has a significantly negative eﬀect on both versions of
total equity incentives. Most of the coeﬃcients are significant at the 1% level, and the magnitudes
are larger compared to those in Tables III and IV. Intuitively, risks should have a larger impact
on total equity incentives than on new equity incentives due to the cumulative eﬀect.
To summarize, Prediction 1 of our model is strongly supported by various empirical specifi-
cations for both new and total equity incentives. In particular, PPS of new or total equity grants
is aﬀected positively by a firm’s idiosyncratic risk and negatively by its systematic risk.
It is worth noting that our empirical finding of a positive impact of idiosyncratic risk on total
equity incentives cannot be taken as evidence against, nor be compared to, the negative impact
documented by Jin (2002) and Garvey andMilbourn (2003) because our risk measures are diﬀerent
32
from theirs. In particular, our risk measures are volatilities of stock returns while theirs are return
volatilities multiplied by the firm’s market capitalization. As discussed earlier, our risk measures
do not lead to the multicollinearity problems that exist in these papers. Moreover, our finding
of a positive eﬀect of firm idiosyncratic risk on PPS remains the same after controlling for the
eﬀects of dollar risk measures (please see the Internet Appendix)20. Our finding is also consistent
with findings in Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Core and Guay (1999, 2002a, and 2002b), and Coles,
Daniel, and Naveen (2006), who use the same risk measures as ours.
C. Test of Prediction 2: Eﬀects of Idiosyncratic and Systematic Risks on The Ratio of Total
Compensation to Firm Size
Before conducting the regression analysis, it is useful to examine the time-series behavior
of the main variables. In Table VI, we report the year-by-year medians of the key variables.
Table VI is here.
We also present the corresponding plots in Figures 3 through 6.
Figures 3 to 6 are here.
Let us first examine compensation. Since the samples for 1992 and 1993 are relatively small and
biased towards large firms, we use the 1994 sample as the base case for the following discussions.
There is an upward trend in annual compensation, as apparent in Table VI and Figure 3. The
median equity-related pay and total compensation increased from $805 000 and $1 962 000 in
1994 to $2 771 000 and $3 516 000 in 2009, respectively. The corresponding percentage increases
are 244% and 79%. The numbers suggest that the increase in total pay is mostly due to the
increase in equity-related pay.
To examine the trend in firm size, in Table VI we report the annual medians for firm sales
and market capitalization (the trend for book assets is similar). Clearly, there is positive growth
in median firm size during the sample period. Market capitalization increased 40% from 1994
to 2009. This growth rate is much lower than those in equity-related pay and total pay. The
diﬀerential growth rates are manifested by the trend in the median ratio of total pay to firm
size. The median ratio exhibits a positive trend (see Figure 4), increasing from $1.59 per $1,000
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in 1994 to $1.94 per $1,000 in 2009 (see Table VI). As for the risk measures, the median firm
idiosyncratic risk is much higher than the median firm systematic risk, as apparent in Figure 5.
Moreover, the median idiosyncratic risk increased from 1994 to 2004 and declined afterwards. This
nonmonotonic pattern is consistent with the evidence documented in the asset pricing literature.21
The most salient and relevant observations from Table VI and Figures 3 to 6 are: (1) equity-
related compensation and total compensation have increased; and (2) the increase in total com-
pensation has outpaced the increase in firm size.
Next, we formally investigate how firms’ risks aﬀect the ratio of CEO pay to firm size. Specif-
ically, we run the following regression to test Prediction 2:
 = 1 + 2Firm idiosyncratic risk + 3Firm systematic risk
+ 4Macro proxy + 5CEO Age+ 6CEO Tenure + 7 log (Firm size)
+8Firm growth+ 9Free cash flow + 10Capital/sales
+ 11R&D/capital + 12R&D missing dummy + 13Advertising/capital
+ 14Advertising missing dummy + 15Investment/capital + 
(18)
The pay-size ratio is computed based on three measures of firm size: 1) market capitalization;
2) sales; and 3) book assets. For brevity, we only report the results based on sales in Table
VII. The results based on book assets and market capitalization are qualitatively similar and are
presented in the Internet Appendix. Panel A of Table VII presents the complete results for the
base case. For the same reason as for Table IV, Panel B of Table VII reports only the coeﬃcients
of the two risk measures for the robustness tests.
Table VII is here.
Our main finding is that the ratio  is aﬀected positively by firm idiosyncratic risk
and negatively by firm systematic risk, confirming Prediction 2. Based on the magnitude of
the regression coeﬃcients,  is much more sensitive to firm idiosyncratic risk than to
firm systematic risk. To illustrate, let us focus on the median regression in Panel A when the
macro variable is proxied by the negative commercial paper spread. An increase of one standard
deviation in idiosyncratic risk (approximately 19%) results in an increase of $1299 per $1,000
(= 6837 × 19%) in the ratio while an increase of one standard deviation in systematic risk
(approximately 10%) results in a reduction of $0340 per $1,000 (= 3404× 10%). Given that the
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median pay-size ratio of the sample is $181 per $1,000, the impact of firm risk measures on the
pay-size ratio is not only statistically significant, but also economically important.
Turning to the robustness tests, even though the magnitude of the coeﬃcients varies among
the diﬀerent specifications, firm idiosyncratic risk consistently has a significantly positive impact
on the pay-size ratio while firm systematic risk has a significantly negative impact. In sum, the
empirical results support Prediction 2 on the relationship between risks and the pay-size ratio.
V. Conclusion
This paper addresses two questions regarding executive compensation: (1) how does PPS
depend on systematic and idiosyncratic risks, and (2) how does the pay-size ratio depend on these
risks? To address these questions, we integrate an agency problem into search theory and analyze
the market equilibrium with many firms and CEOs. Our model diﬀers from a standard static
agency model with a single agent-firm pair along three dimensions. First, instead of focusing
on total risk as in the extant literature, our model distinguishes a firm’s idiosyncratic risk from
systematic risk. Second, a CEO can choose to quit after privately observing the idiosyncratic
shock. Third, there are contracting interactions/externalities among firms in the market equilib-
rium that work through endogenous outside options and matching probabilities. In our setup,
each firm oﬀers an incentive contract to the CEO that achieves the optimal trade-oﬀ between the
probability of retaining the CEO and the expected profit conditional on retention. This trade-oﬀ
generates an optimal PPS that is less than one for a risk-neutral CEO. More importantly, the
search process endogenously determines CEOs’ and firms’ outside options, which reflect the exter-
nalities in the market equilibrium. The externalities induce novel eﬀects of the risks on incentive
contracts, which are confirmed by our empirical tests using CEO compensation data from 1992 to
2009. First, the equilibrium PPS depends positively on a firm’s idiosyncratic risk, and negatively
on a firm’s systematic risk. This is in contrast to agency models with exogenous outside options,
where the two risks always aﬀect PPS in the same way. This result oﬀers a plausible explanation
for the ambiguous empirical relationship between PPS and a firm’s total risk. Second, the ratio
of a CEO’s total compensation to firm value depends positively on firm idiosyncratic risks and
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negatively on firm systematic risks.
A natural extension of the current study is to investigate whether the model predictions hold
for executive compensation practices worldwide. For example, Oxelheim, Wihlborg, and Zhang
(2010) show that macroeconomic influences on Swedish CEOs’ compensation are substantial.
It would be relevant to investigate how firms’ systematic and idiosyncratic risks aﬀect European
executive compensation. Moreover, although European executives receive less compensation than
their American counterparts, their compensation has also risen in recent years (see Oxelheim and
Wihlborg (2008)). It would be interesting to see how European compensation has evolved relative
to firm size and whether firm risk factors significantly aﬀect the relative growth of compensation
to firm size.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
We start by reformulating the contracting problem with ( ) as a firm’s choices, instead
of ( ). To do so, we invert (5) to obtain E () = − ¯2E(22). Substituting this expression
and using (3) to compute E(∗ − ∗), we rewrite (8) as




2E(22) + E[(1− )2]− (+ )
¤ 1 () . (1)
The maximization problem above is the reformulated contracting problem.
Parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1 : Consider the maximization problem in (1). For any
given ( ), the objective function in (1) is continuous in the choices ( ). Because the set
of feasible choices is ( ) ∈ [0 1] × [¯ 1], which is compact, the Theorem of the Maximum
(see page 62 in Stokey and Lucas with Prescott (1989)) implies that the maximum is attained
by a feasible choice. In this proof, let us denote the optimal choices as (∗() ∗) by suppressing
their dependence on ( + ). Note that  is independent of . Also note that the objective
function is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in ( ). With diﬀerentiability, we can verify that
the objective function is strictly concave in  and  separately. However, the objective function is
not necessarily concave in ( ) jointly. To circumvent this problem, we use a two-step procedure
to prove that the optimal choices are unique. First, for any fixed , we prove that the optimal
choice of  is unique. Second, taking into account the dependence of the optimal choice of 
on  obtained in the first step, we prove that the resulting objective function is strictly concave
in  and hence the optimal choice ∗ is unique. In this procedure we also prove that ∗() is
independent of  and that the interior optimal choices satisfy (12).
Take the first step. For any given  ∈ [¯ 1], denote the optimal choice of  as ˆ( ).
Clearly, ˆ(∗ ) = ∗(). Because the objective function in (1) is strictly concave in () for any
given , the optimal choice, ˆ( ), is unique. If ˆ( ) is at either corner of [0 1], then clearly it
is independent of . So, consider interior ˆ( ). Because the objective function is continuously
diﬀerentiable in (), the interior ˆ( ) is characterized by the first-order condition, which is
ˆ( ) = (+ 1)2. Because  is independent of , ˆ( ) = ˆ() is independent of . It follows
that, ∗() = ˆ(∗) is independent of . This procedure also establishes that the first equation in
(12) holds whenever ∗ is interior.
Take the second step. Substituting () = ˆ(), we write the objective function in (1) as
() = [1−1(¯)](ˆ() ), where ( ) is defined by (11). Using the uniform distribution 1,
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we can directly verify  00()  0. Thus, the optimal choice ∗ is unique and independent of .
This implies that ∗ is also unique, because ∗ = ˆ(∗) and because ˆ() is unique for any given
. If ∗ is interior, then  0(∗) = 0, which can be written as ∗ − 2∗ + +∗Ω = 0. Substituting
∗ = (∗ + 1)2 into the first term of this condition, we get the second equation in (12).
Now we prove that, under the restrictions on (+) specified in Proposition 1, the equations
in (12) have a unique solution that is interior. Substituting ∗ from the second equation into the
first equation in (12), we get
32 − 2− (+ )Ω = 0
This quadratic equation has a real solution if and only if + ≥ −Ω3. Maintain this condition.
Then the above quadratic equation has two real solutions generically. Because the quadratic
expression is minimized at  = 13, the smaller solution is less than or equal to 13 and hence
less than 12, in which case the first equation in (12) implies ∗  0  ¯. Thus, the smaller
solution is not admissible. The larger solution for ∗ to the quadratic equation above is given by
the first equation in (13), and the implied solution for ∗ is given by the second equation. This
solution satisfies ∗  1 if and only if +   Ω. This condition also guarantees ∗  1, because
∗ = 2∗ − 1 by the first equation in (12). Moreover, ∗  ¯ if and only if ∗  12( ¯¯ + 1) = ¯ ,
which is equivalent to +  Ω2¯ (3¯ −1). Note that this lower bound on (+) is greater than
−Ω4 and hence greater than −Ω3, which was imposed earlier for ∗ to be a real number. Thus,
the unique solution for the pair (∗ ∗) to (12) is interior if and only if Ω2¯ (3¯ − 1)  +   Ω.
Finally, (5) yields E (∗) = − (∗)2∗Ω.
Parts (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 1 : Consider the solution for (∗ ∗) given by (13). Clearly,
 and  aﬀect (∗ ∗) only through the sum (+). Also, (13) shows that an increase in (+)
increases ∗ and ∗. Because the CEO’s incentive pay is equal to (∗)2 ¯Ω, it increases with  and
 . Expected salary is equal to E (∗) =  − (∗)2∗Ω. By increasing (∗ ∗), an increase in 













This is positive if and only if +   Ω, which is maintained in Proposition 1.
A higher  is reflected by a higher value of E(2) and a higher  by a higher value of ¯.
Both risks increase Ω. It is clear from (13) that the two risks aﬀect (∗ ∗) only through Ω. Also,
(13) shows that an increase in Ω increases (∗ ∗) if and only if +   0. The incentive pay at
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This is clearly positive if  +  ≤ Ω3. Consider the case in which  +   Ω3. In this case,




¤2. This condition is
equivalent to +  Ω, which is maintained. Thus, an increase in Ω increases (∗)2∗Ω. Because
E (∗) = − (∗)2∗Ω, the expected salary decreases in Ω. QED
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2
According to the definition in Section I.C, we determine a market equilibrium by solving
for the contract  = ( ), the induced choices by the CEO ( ∗), the value functions (   ,
), and the measures ( ). The eﬀort level ∗ is given by (2) as a function of . In Proposition
1, we have already solved ( ) and E () as functions of ( ). We derive (14) and (15) below,
which give ( ) and  as functions of . We also solve ( ) and  jointly from (13), (14),
and (15). Once this is done, we can determine other equilibrium objects easily. Specifically, we
can recover  and  from (14) and (15), compute a searching CEO’s matching probability as
 = 1− , compute the value function  as  = 0, and compute the value functions ( )
from (6) and (7). Moreover, we can compute  from (10) by setting +1 = , solve  = −1 − 1,
and recover  = . In the procedure below, we suppress the superscript ∗ on optimal choices
and the tilde on other firms’ choices.
To derive (14) and (15), we impose symmetry between firms’ choices and stationarity, as
required by the equilibrium. Substituting the properties of the optimal contract,  = 2− 1  0
and E () =  − 2Ω, we can solve  from (6),  from (7), and  from (1). With
stationarity, the outside options are  =  −  and  = − , where we use the free-entry
condition  = 0. Substituting the solutions of ( ) into the expression for  and using
 = 1 − , we get  as in (14). Inverting (13) to get  +  = (3 − 2)Ω and substituting it
into the solution just obtained for  , we get  and  as in (14). Setting  = 0 in (9) yields
 = ( ), which produces (15) after substituting  from (14).
To solve ( ) and  jointly from (13), (14), and (15), we substitute  from (15) into (14) to
get  =  − 2 . Adding this result to the expression for  in (14), we get (16). Substituting
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(16) into the expression for  in (13), we find that the equilibrium PPS solves () = 0, where
() ≡ 4(1− )2 + 2(3− 2) + −2Ω  (1)
The constant  is defined in (15) as  = (1 − )¯(√3). Let us determine the admissible





¯ . Note that
¯  12 because   0. In addition, the equilibrium must satisfy
 ∈ (0 1). From (15), we know that  lies in (0 1) if and only if (1 − )2  (2Ω). For all
 ∈ (¯ 1), the function (1 − )2 is strictly decreasing and hence achieves the maximum at
the left corner ¯. Also, the function is equal to zero at  = 1. Thus, a necessary condition for
 ∈ (0 1) is   2Ω¯ (1 − ¯ )2. Under this condition,  ∈ (0 1) if and only if  ∈ (¯ 1),
where 1 ∈ (¯ 1) is defined by
1(1− 1)2 = (2Ω) (2)
Note that 1 is independent of the parameter . The admissible interval for  is (¯ 1).
Now we establish that a unique solution for equilibrium  exists. Compute
0() = 4(3− 1)[1− (1− )] + Ω  00() = 8(3− 2) + 12
Assume that 00(12) ≥ 0, (¯)  0, and (1)  0, which we support with explicit restric-
tions on the parameters. Because 00() is strictly increasing in , the assumption 00(12) ≥ 0
implies that for all   12, 00()  0 and hence 0() is strictly increasing. It is evident that
0(1)  0. If 0(12) ≥ 0, then 0()  0 for all   12. If 0(12)  0, then there exists
0 ∈ (12 1) such that 0()  0 for  ∈ (12 0) and 0()  0 for  ∈ (0 1). In both cases, the
assumptions (¯)  0 and (1)  0 ensure that a unique solution exists in the admissible
interval (¯ 1). Furthermore, the solution has the property 0()  0.
To summarize the above proof, we find that there is a unique and admissible solution for
equilibrium  if the following conditions hold:   2Ω¯ (1− ¯ )2, 00(12) ≥ 0, (¯)  0,
and (1)  0. Let us express these conditions more explicitly as follows:




√3 ≤ 3(1−) − 1  1 ≡ ¯
©Ω
¯
£ − 2√3 (1− (1− ))¤+ 2 ª 







There is a nonempty region of () that satisfies the first two conditions, and this region
is independent of the parameter . Given () in this region, the interval (1 2) that
satisfies the last two conditions is nonempty by construction. Thus, there is a nonempty region
of the parameters ( ) that satisfies all conditions above.
For comparative statics, let us establish the results   ¯
2√3  1, 1  4, and ∗  2
under the restriction  ≥ 12(1−) . Because   0, we have   
√
3, ¯  2√3, and 2  ¯.
The restriction on  implies   ¯
2√3  1 and 1  (2¯)  4. To prove ∗  2,










Because   1  4, 1− 6  0 and so the right-hand side of the above inequality is an
increasing function of . A suﬃcient condition for the inequality to hold is that it holds at
 = 4, which is equivalent to   1, which we just established.
We now establish results (i) and (ii) stated in Proposition 2. The aggregate shock aﬀects ∗
exclusively through E(2) which appears in Ω in the function (). A higher  or  leads to







The inequality follows from the result ∗  2, which we just established, and the fact that
0(∗)  0. To examine the eﬀect of  on ∗, note that ¯ = +
√




















− 3∗ + 2
¸





− 3∗+2  0. The left-hand side of this
inequality is a strictly decreasing function of ∗. It is positive at ∗ = 23 and negative at ∗ = 1.





− 32 + 2 = 0. (4)
Moreover, ∗  0 if ∗  2 and ∗  0 if ∗  2.
Finally, we turn to part (iii) of Proposition 2. Recall ∗ = 2Ω∗(1 − ∗)2 from (14) and
E (∗) =  − ∗2∗Ω from Proposition 1. Also, since ∗∗ = ∗22, we have E(∗∗) =
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2
¯ ∗2Ω. Substituting E (∗) and E(∗∗), and integrating over , we get







= 2Ω∗(1− ∗)(2∗ − 1) + (1− ∗)∗ = ∗
h
2∗−1
1−∗ + (1− ∗)
i

The ratio between expected total pay and firm value, denoted by , is computed as
 = E(∗+∗∗)∗ = 2
∗−1
1−∗ + (1− ∗)
We obtain

 = 1(1−∗)2 − . Since (1 − ∗)−2  4 for ∗  12 and   3 due to √3 ≤
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+ 4∗ £1− (1− ∗)2¤− (1− ∗)0(∗)i .
Tedious algebra shows that









+ 43 £1− (1− 3)2¤− (1− 3)0(3) = 0 (5)
This completes the proof of part (iii) in Proposition 2. QED
Appendix C. Equilibrium Long-Term Incentive Contract
Now we extend the contract studied in Section III to include a retention reward payment.
This extension is motivated by existing option grant practice which exhibits the following features.
First, a firm normally grants options to its CEO on a yearly basis. These grants are intended
to increase retention and incentives. Second, an option grant has a vesting period that normally
lasts five years and a CEO can only exercise a fraction of his accumulated options that have
vested. If the CEO is fired, he may get part of the retention account as settlement but if the
CEO voluntarily quits, he has to forgo the remaining unvested options. Based on these features,
we introduce a retention reward mechanism as follows. If the CEO is newly matched with a
firm, he starts with a zero balance in the retention account. The firm will put amount  into the
account in the current period. The CEO can receive a fraction  of the retention account balance
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if he works for the firm next period. This mechanism is carried out as long as the CEO continues
to work for the firm. Denote a contract with this reward mechanism as  = (  ), where  and
 have the same meanings as in the baseline model. Denote the balance of the retention account
at the beginning of a period as . The balance in the next period is
+1 = (1 + ) [+ (1− ) ] 
where (1− )  is the amount in the retention account immediately after paying the CEO in
the current period. This amount is augmented by the firm’s injection into the account, . The
retention account earns risk-free interest at the rate .
At the beginning of the current period, if a matched CEO is separated from the firm exoge-
nously, he can negotiate with the firm to settle the retention account. This settlement can be
understood as the CEO’s severance pay if he is fired by the firm. Negotiation is costly for both
sides. Let us model the negotiation cost as a reduction in the retention account of (). We use
the Nash bargaining rule to determine the split of the remaining amount,  − (), between the
firm and the CEO, where the CEO’s bargaining power is  ∈ (0 1). That is, the CEO receives
 [ − ()] and the firm receives (1− ) [ − ()]. However, if a CEO who has survived the ex-
ogenous job separation shock decides to quit, he has to forgo the money in the retention account.
This treatment is similar to the forgone unvested options in practice. In this case, the firm will
claim the entire balance of the retention account.
The value function of a searching CEO is still  . Note that in the event that a CEO just
separated from a job exogenously and settled an account  with the firm,  is measured after
the settlement is already paid. If a searching CEO gets a match, he will start the next period
with zero balance in the retention account, and so the future value function in this case will be
(+1 = 0). Modifying (7), we have
 =  +  [(+1 = 0) + (1− )+1] 
The value function of a CEO who enters a period as matched is now denoted as  (). Similar
to the baseline model, we can compute an employed CEO’s expected utility over  in the current
period as E() =  + 22E(2). A CEO accepts a contract if and only if  + 22E(2) +
(+1)  . This acceptance condition can be written as  ≥ ()¯, where the cutoﬀ ratio
() is
() = 12Ω [ − (+1)− ]  (1)
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If a CEO separates from the job exogenously, he obtains the settlement income [ − ()].
Incorporating this income, we modify (6) as




¡+ 2 ¯Ω+ (+1)¢ 1() + 1(¯)i 
Substituting salary  in terms of  from (1) and integrating over , we obtain:




Denote the value function of a firm with a CEO as  () and the value function of a firm
without a CEO as  . If a searching firm just settled a retention account with a separating CEO,
 is measured after the settlement receipts are counted. If a searching firm gets a match, the
firm will start the next period with zero balance in the retention account, and so the future value
function in this case will be  (+1 = 0). Thus,
 = − +  [ (+1 = 0) + (1− )+1] 
For a firm with a matched CEO, the value function is














 =  − (+1)− 2Ω and  = +1
1 +  − (1− )
As in the baseline model,  () is computed before  and  are realized and hence is independent
of  and . The Bellman equation (2) modifies the one in the baseline model in three ways.
First, the firm receives (1−)(−()) from the retention account when the firm’s CEO separates
exogenously and receives  when the CEO quits. Second, the firm injects  in the retention account
when the CEO stays in the current period, in addition to paying salary and the incentive amount.
As a result, the firm’s profit in the current period is − = 2(1− )Ω¯ − − , which appears
inside the integral in (2). Third, because the future balance in the retention account +1 will
depend on the current injection , the firm incorporates this dependence as a constraint.
Since there is a one-to-one mapping between  and +1, we can restate the contract as  =
(  +1). By doing so, we can easily formulate the dynamic contracting problem by taking
the retention account balance in the current period  as the state variable. In other words, the
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firm chooses the contract for the current period,  = (  +1), while taking  , +1, and
 (+1) as given. Also, the firm anticipates that the CEO’s eﬀort ∗ and acceptance rule ()
will depend on the contract. Solving the dynamic maximization problem in (2) leads to the
following optimal contract:









(+1) + (+1) + +11+
´i12 
 = (+1)−  −Ω2(2− 1)
() = 2− 1
with (+1) =  − (+1) and (+1) =  −  (+1) interpreted as the eﬀective outside
options for a CEO and a firm, respectively. The above optimal contract indicates that when
(+1) + (+1) + +11+  0, PPS decreases with  and . The eﬀects of  and  on PPS are
opposite when (+1) + (+1) + +11+  0. However, we will show that  and  have diﬀerent
eﬀects on PPS in a market equilibrium when  ,  , (+1), and  (+1) are endogenously
determined.
For the market equilibrium, we can modify the definition in Section I.C to incorporate the
retention account. The equilibrium values of (  +1 ), (    , ), and ( ) can be
solved from the following set of equations:
(+1) =  − (+1) (3)






 = (+1)−  −Ω2(2− 1) (6)




(+1) + (+1) + +11+
´i12  (7)
() = 2− 1 (8)
 () =  (1− )−  (1− )() + (1− ) (1− )2 2¯Ω√3  (9)
 = − +  [ (0) + (1− ) ]  (10)
45
 =  +  [(0) + (1− ) ]  (11)
() =  +  [ − ()] + (1− ) 2(1− )2 ¯Ω√3  (12)
+1 = + (1− + ) £ + (1− )1(¯+1)¤−  (13)
 () =  (14)
 = 1−  (15)










which is the same as in the baseline case. We then substitute the expressions for , (+1),
and  (+1) in (7). Using (14) and (15), we can rewrite (7) as follows:
() = () + 2
µ
 − 
1 +  − ()
¶
= 0
where () is defined in (1) in Appendix B. Since () depends on  in the same way () does,
we conclude that the dependence of the equilibrium PPS on , , and  remains the same as
in Proposition 2. In other words, the introduction of the long-term incentive reward changes the
level of  but not the dependence of  on the risks.
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1Prendergast (2002) summarizes additional conflicting empirical evidence on this relationship.
2A negative joint value of outside options means that the joint value of breaking the relation-
ship now falls below the joint future value of continuing the relationship. In an intertemporal
setting, positive and negative joint values of outside options are both possible.
3An alternative way to retain a CEO is to increase his salary. But in equilibrium increasing
salary is not an eﬀective way to retain the CEO for two reasons. First, while a firm only wants
to retain a CEO with a high matching quality, increasing salary would increase the retention
probability of all types of CEOs. Second, increasing PPS can also increase the optimal eﬀort
level, which is particularly valuable when the realized matching quality is high.
4In a summary of the new perspectives of search theory, Shi (2008) points out that integration
of contract theory with search theory is a promising research agenda.
5A few other studies focus on the relationship between firm risk and PPS from diﬀerent
perspectives. For example, Shi (2011) diﬀerentiates respondable and nonrespondable risk. Guo
and Ou-Yang (2006) focus on the wealth eﬀects while Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) focus
on the role of risk in franchising.
6For example, in the literature on CEO compensation, Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009)
promote the multiplicative specification by arguing that a majority of CEO actions are “rolled
out” across the entire company and hence have a greater eﬀect in a larger firm. It is useful to
note that a generalization of the profit function is  = . The analytical results are the same
for all  ≥ 12, but the algebra is simpler with  = 12.
7We focus on idiosyncratic heterogeneity occurring ex post rather than ex ante. It is well
known that a large fraction of the wage diﬀerential among workers cannot be explained by ob-
servable heterogeneity (see Mortensen (2005)). This is also likely to be the case for managers. An
excellent CEO in a mining firm may or may not be a good CEO in a software firm. Specifically,
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Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2010) document evidence that CEOs’ personal or behavioral traits
such as optimism and managerial risk-aversion are related to corporate financial policies. They
also show that certain types of firms appear to attract executives with particular psychological
profiles and that CEOs’ behavioral traits help explain compensation structure.
8In Appendix C, we add a long-term retention reward to the contract, which resembles the
extend of option grants in practice. We show that the qualitative features of the incentive contract
remain the same. We do not consider fully dynamic (recursive) contracts because such contracts
would be extremely diﬃcult to deal with.
9Whether  is realized before or after a CEO chooses eﬀort matters only slightly for the
analysis. If  is realized before the eﬀort choice,  aﬀects the decisions through E(2), as shown
in Sections II and III. If  is realized after the eﬀort choice,  aﬀects the decisions through
[E()]2. If  6= 1 and if  is not too small, then the two terms have the common property that
they increase in the variance of . This is the property we need in the analysis.
10The specific matching function has constant returns to scale and is strictly concave in the
two arguments,  and . The intuition for the main results of our paper should hold for more
general matching functions, but the algebra becomes more complicated.
11We do not model the possibility of contract renegotiation when the CEO chooses to quit.
Such renegotiation complicates the analysis significantly because a CEO might pretend to quit
just to renegotiate the contract even when  is high. Also, we assume that the firm has some
inalienable knowledge asset necessary for the operation, which makes it not optimal for the firm
to sell the operation to the CEO. This assumption is implicit in the contract that all payments
between the firm and the CEO must occur after production is carried out.
12Standard models typically assume that the profit function is additive in the agent’s eﬀort
and the shocks, rather than multiplicative as in our model. However, even if standard models are
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modified to have a multiplicative profit function, risk aversion will continue to be the reason why
PPS is below one, and so the optimal PPS will likely be decreasing with the two risks.
13Because these restrictions guarantee that ∗ and ∗ are interior, they ensure that the sum
(+ ) generated by the equilibrium satisfies the bounds imposed in Proposition 1.
14“Salary” in the empirical section corresponds to the “base wage” in the theoretical model.
15We thank the editor for suggesting the use of the credit spread as a proxy.
16We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting these additional control variables.
17For ease of exposition, hereafter “commercial paper spread” or “NCP spread” will be used
to stand for “negative lagged commercial paper spread.” Likewise, “credit spread” or “NCredit
Spread” will stand for “negative credit spread.”
18We also perform regressions with industry fixed eﬀects. Results are qualitatively similar. As
argued by Jin (2002), the intrinsic problem with fixed eﬀect regressions is that if idiosyncratic risk
and systematic risk do not change much over time, then fixed eﬀects will absorb much of the risk-
induced cross-sectional variation in PPS. This concern is especially relevant for firm systematic
risk since all firms in an industry should have similar exposure to market risk.
19For our sample period, $6 845 million is the average market value of equity, and 1710% is
the average stock return. Therefore, $6 845 million×1710% is the average change in shareholder
wealth during a year.
20The lnternet Appendix is available in the online version of this article on the Journal of
Finance website.
21In the asset pricing literature, Campell et al. (2001) first document a noticeable increasing
trend in firm-specific risk for the period 1962 to 1997. However, Brandt et al. (2010) show
that during recent years, idiosyncratic volatility has fallen substantially, reversing any time trend
documented by Campell et al. (2001). They also find that the late 1990s surge and 2000s reversal
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in idiosyncratic volatility is most evident in firms with low stock prices and limited institutional
ownership. Another recent paper by Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2010) examines aggregate
idiosyncratic volatility in 23 developed equity markets and finds no evidence of upward trends.
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Firms and A match is For an unseparated A match- The CEO decides Aggregate The CEO chooses Unmatched The job market
CEOs are exgenously match, the firm specific whether shock y effort, profit is firms pay opens for
matched or separated offers a shock to accept is realized. realized, and hiring costs. unmatched
unmatched. with contract to x  is the contract. the CEO is paid. CEOs and firms.
probability . the CEO. realized.
VE , VS , J F , and J H  are measured here.  
 
Figure 1. Timing of events in each period. 
 
In the above figure, VE is the value function of an employed CEO, VS is the value function of a CEO searching for a job, JF is the value function of a firm with a matched CEO, 
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Figure 2. Determination of optimal b and  
                          
 
Figure 3.  Time trend for median annual pay.                                                                                   Figure 4.  Time trend for median ratio between pay and size. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                            
 
 
Figure 5. Time trend for median firm risks.                                                                                       Figure 6. Time trend for macro proxies. 
 
                
Table I  
Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics on CEO compensation and characteristics, firm characteristics, and macroeconomic variables for 12,890 firm-years over the period 1992 to 2009. CEO 
compensation and characteristics data are retrieved from ExecuComp, and firm characteristics data are from COMPUSTAT and CRSP.  Firm total risk is stock return volatility over the 60 months 
prior to the fiscal year. New equity incentives are PPS for a CEO based on the stock and option grant for the fiscal year with respect to a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth.  Total equity 
incentives are PPS for a CEO based on the cumulative stock and option grants with respect to a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. Two versions of total equity incentives are obtained: Version 
1 is based on all available information while Version 2 is computed using the one-year approximation method proposed by Core and Guay (2002a). CEO tenure is the number of years a person has 
been the CEO of a firm. Firm systematic risk is equal to a firm's beta multiplied by the stock market risk while firm idiosyncratic risk is the square root of the difference between total return 
variance and systematic return variance.  The commercial paper spread is defined as the difference between the annualized rate on three-month commercial paper and the three-month T-bill rate, 
while the credit spread is the difference between the yield of Baa and Aaa bonds. All monetary variables are deflated using 2005 dollars.   
 
Variables Mean Std Dev Min.
25% 
Percentile
Median 7 5% 
Percentile
Max. Skewness Kurtosis
Salary  (Thousand) $7 27 $338 $38 $47 3 $67 2 $923 $1,911 0.92 4.02
Bonus (Thousand) $635 $931 $0 $0 $324 $818 $5,322 2.7 3 11 .95
Equity  Incentive Pay  (Thousand) $3,362 $5,003 $0 $491 $1,513 $3,985 $28,863 2.91 12.7 2
Total Compensation (Thousand) $4,7 87 $5,7 98 $251 $1,396 $2,7 57 $5,641 $34,27 1 2.83 12.41
New Equity  Incentives
(Per $1,000 Change in Shareholder Wealth)
$1.96 $2.92 $0.00 $0.27 $0.98 $2.36 $18.07 3.14 14.94
Total Equity  Incentives: Version 1
(Per $1 ,000 Change in Shareholder Wealth)
$28.34 $49.28 $0.09 $3.27 $11.15 $29.12 $331.26 3.52 17 .31
Total Equity  Incentives: Version 2
(Per $1,000 Change in Shareholder Wealth)
$28.37 $49.59 $0.11 $2.94 $10.82 $29.64 $335.14 3.50 17 .22
CEO Tenure 7 .88 7 .15 0.50 2.7 5 5.67 10.59 37 .02 1.7 2 6.22
CEO Age 55.37 7 .01 39.00 51.00 56.00 60.00 7 5.00 0.06 2.87
Firm Total Risk 43% 20% 16% 29% 38% 53% 115% 1.29 4.59
Firm Idiosy ncratic Risk 40% 19% 14% 26% 35% 49% 107 % 1.23 4.47
Firm Sy stematic Risk 15% 10% 1% 9% 13% 19% 54% 1.44 5.65
Market Capitalization (Million) $6,845 $17 ,003 $40 $543 $1,486 $4,7 7 1 $119,311 4.7 2 27 .69
Sales (Million) $4,993 $10,244 $27 $520 $1,398 $4,287 $66,097 3.93 20.32
Sales Growth 11% 24% -49% 0% 8% 19% 110% 1.28 7 .31
Industry  Sales Growth 4% 11% -43% -2% 4% 9% 61% 0.28 6.34
Commercial Paper Spread (Basis Points) 27 .7 2 17 1 17 27 38 7 3 0.7 8 4.12
GDP Growth 3% 2% -3% 2% 3% 4% 5% -1.47 5.11
Credit Spread (Basis Points) 94 39 60 69 83 92 198 1.7 4 4.90
Panel A: CEO Compensation and Characteristics
Panel B: Firm Characteristics
Panel C: Macroeconomic Variables
Table II  
Correlations 
 
This table reports the correlations among explanatory variables and control variables for 12,890 firm-years over the period 1992 to 2009. CEO compensation and characteristics data are retrieved 
from ExecuComp, and firm characteristics data are from COMPUSTAT and CRSP.  CEO tenure is the number of years a person has been the CEO of a firm. Firm total risk is stock return volatility 
over the 60 months prior to the fiscal year. Firm systematic risk is equal to a firm's beta multiplied by the stock market risk while firm idiosyncratic risk is the square root of the difference between 
total return variance and systematic return variance.  The commercial paper spread (CP spread) is defined as the difference between the annualized rate on three-month commercial paper and the 
three-month T-bill rate, while the credit spread is the difference between the yield of Baa and Aaa bonds. All monetary variables are deflated using 2005 dollars.   
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Industry  Sales Growth 1.000
Lagged CP Spread 0.421 1 .000
GDP Growth -0.204 -0.430 1.000
Credit Spread -0.356 -0.862 0.459 1.000
Market Capitalization 0.015 0.009 0.008 -0.005 1.000
Sales -0.008 -0.033 0.019 0.034 0.7 36 1.000
Sales Growth 0.27 7 0.204 -0.110 -0.191 0.023 -0.017 1 .000
CEO Tenure 0.028 0.045 0.000 -0.045 -0.054 -0.080 0.061 1.000
CEO Age 0.009 0.047 -0.012 -0.050 0.07 3 0.082 -0.038 0.415 1.000
Firm Total Risk 0.008 0.001 -0.27 0 -0.004 -0.214 -0.27 0 0.115 0.027 -0.185 1.000
Firm Idiosy ncratic Risk 0.012 0.018 -0.264 -0.015 -0.235 -0.288 0.124 0.030 -0.187 0.987 1.000




Base Test of Prediction 1 - Effects of Firm Risks on Pay-to-Performance Sensitivity of New Equity Incentive Grants 
 
This table reports the base case results of the regression (17) for 12, 890 firm-years over the period 1992 to 2009. CEO compensation and characteristics data are retrieved from ExecuComp, and 
firm characteristics data are from COMPUSTAT and CRSP. New equity incentives are PPS for a CEO based on the stock and option grant for the fiscal year with respect to a $1,000 change in 
shareholder wealth. Firm total risk is stock return volatility over the 60 months prior to the fiscal year. Firm systematic risk is equal to a firm's beta multiplied by stock market risk while firm 
idiosyncratic risk is the square root of the difference between total return variance and systematic return variance.  CEO tenure is the number of years a person has been the CEO of a firm.  Firm 
size is measured by sales.  Firm growth is sales growth.  Free cash flow is operating cash flow minus dividends over assets. NCP spread is the negative lagged commercial paper spread and NCredit 
spread is the negative credit spread.  The commercial paper spread is defined as the difference between the annualized rate on three-month commercial paper and the three-month T-bill rate, while 
the credit spread is the difference between the yield of Baa and Aaa bonds. All monetary variables are deflated using 2005 dollars.  We also run regressions by replacing “idiosyncratic” and 
“systematic” risks with “total risk.” The coefficient and t-value for total risk are reported at the bottom of the table. For OLS regressions, standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  For median 





Firm Idiosyncratic Risk + 2.7 16 *** 3.369 *** 2.7 54 *** 2.7 31 *** 1 .960 *** 2.505 *** 2.029 *** 2.000 ***
(10.57 4) (12.284) (10.7 19) (10.650) (14.341) (17 .313) (14.87 8) (14.521)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -1 .105 *** -0.924 ** -1 .259 *** -1 .192 *** -0.7 35 *** -0.57 4 *** -0.843 *** -0.7 7 8 ***
(-2.823 (-2.365) (-3.214) (-3.044) (-4.090) (-3.025) (-4.67 1) (-4.27 2)
Industry  Sales Growth -0.7 80 *** -0.97 7 ***
(-3.028) (-8.986)
NCP Spread (basis points) -0.020 *** -0.011 ***
(-12.497 ) (-15.7 18)
GDP Growth -11 .7 87 *** -10.17 9 ***
(-7 .906) (-15.534)
NCredit Spread (basis points) -0.007 *** -0.006 ***
 (-9.553) (-18.150)
CEO Age -0.020 *** -0.017 *** -0.019 *** -0.018 *** -0.012 *** -0.010 *** -0.008 *** -0.008 ***
(-3.406) (-2.87 2) (-3.17 6) (-3.108) (-5.845) (-5.635) (-4.024) (-4.039)
CEO Tenure -0.012 ** -0.014 ** -0.012 ** -0.012 ** -0.007 *** -0.008 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 ***
(-2.258) (-2.57 7 ) (-2.256) (-2.27 3) (-3.7 80) (-4.27 4) (-3.507 ) (-3.230)
log(Firm Size) -0.383 *** -0.361 *** -0.391 *** -0.395 *** -0.206 *** -0.188 *** -0.208 *** -0.208 ***
(-15.142) (-14.230) (-15.456) (-15.621) (-24.534) (-20.656) (-22.991) (-23.582)
Firm Growth -0.017  0.038  0.069  0.089  -0.003  -0.028  0.013  0.013  
(-0.119) (0.269) (0.483) (0.623) (-0.045) (-0.47 5) (0.212) (0.223)
Free Cash Flow -1.614 *** -1 .541 *** -1 .695 *** -1 .7 09 *** -1 .242 *** -1 .167 *** -1 .228 *** -1 .321 ***
(-2.7 49) (-2.623) (-2.892) (-2.916) (-5.153) (-4.968) (-4.843) (-5.563)
Capital/Sales -0.419 *** -0.435 *** -0.421 *** -0.420 *** -0.197 *** -0.207 *** -0.197 *** -0.191 ***
(-6.595) (-6.812) (-6.612) (-6.610) (-8.7 87 ) (-11 .852) (-10.013) (-10.425)
RD/Capital 0.035  0.005  0.011  -0.001  0.165 *** 0.128 *** 0.138 *** 0.114 ***
(0.526) (0.069) (0.165) (-0.010) (4.7 54) (3.654) (3.802) (3.133)
RD Missing Dummy 0.138 * 0.159 ** 0.135 * 0.134 * 0.027  0.041  0.024  0.014  
(1 .7 46) (2.042) (1 .7 13) (1 .7 12) (1 .082) (1 .622) (1 .025) (0.586)
Advertising/Capital 0.011  0.023  0.028  0.033  0.023  0.069  0.034  0.032  
(0.065) (0.141) (0.17 0) (0.202) (0.261) (0.7 48) (0.394) (0.37 9)
Advertising Missing Dummy -0.040  -0.057  -0.011  0.001  0.017  0.007  0.036  0.029  
(-0.541) (-0.7 7 9) (-0.157 ) (0.018) (0.658) (0.27 0) (1 .440) (1 .220)
Investment/Capital 0.326  0.07 9  0.388  0.422  0.114  -0.126  0.134  0.199  
(1 .206) (0.292) (1 .435) (1 .558) (0.892) (-1 .039) (1 .061) (1 .641)
Adjusted or Pseudo R2 0.132 0.144 0.136 0.138 0.088 0.093 0.094 0.096
Predictions: Traditional Model
Firm Total Risk - 2.057 *** 2.7 18 *** 2.038 *** 2.043 *** 1 .466 *** 1 .97 6 *** 1 .432 *** 1 .446 ***
(9.931) (12.042) (9.87 4) (9.915) (13.043) (16.945) (12.054) (11 .663)




Table IV  
Robustness Test of Prediction 1 - Effects of Firm Risks on Pay-to-Performance Sensitivity of New Equity Incentive Grants 
 
This table reports results of four robustness tests for the PPS of new equity incentives based on the regression (17). The sample period is 1992 to 2009 and the sample size is 12, 890 firm-years. CEO 
compensation and characteristics data are retrieved from ExecuComp, and firm characteristics data are from COMPUSTAT and CRSP. The first test uses the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) 
of the risk measures from the market model (base case), while the second test uses the risk measures obtained from the Fama-French three-factor model. The third test uses the industry average risk 
measures to proxy for the individual risk measures. The last robustness test runs an instrumental variable regression where the industry average risk measures are taken as the instrumental 
variables. All risk measures are annualized and calculated over the 60 months prior to the fiscal year. New equity incentives are the PPS for a CEO based on the stock and option grant for the fiscal 
year with respect to a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. CEO tenure is the number of years a person has been the CEO of a firm. Firm size is measured by sales.  Firm growth is sales growth.  
Free cash flow is operating cash flow minus dividends over assets. Four macro proxies are used in the regressions: industry sales growth, negative lagged commercial paper spread (NCP spread), 
GDP growth, and negative credit spread (Ncredit spread). The commercial paper spread is defined as the difference between the annualized rate on three-month commercial paper and the three-
month T-bill rate, while the credit spread is the difference between the yield of Baa and Aaa bonds. All monetary variables are deflated using 2005 dollars. For brevity, only coefficients on risk 
measures are reported. For OLS regressions, standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  For median regressions, standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping with 500 replications. t-
























CDF of Risks Firm Idiosy ncratic Risk + 1 .848 *** 2.306 *** 1 .866 *** 1 .845 *** 0.996 *** 1 .281 *** 0.998 *** 0.966 ***
(13.27 0) (15.364) (13.407 ) (13.287 ) (19.456) (24.116) (17 .158) (16.443)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -0.207 * -0.207 * -0.280 ** -0.251 ** -0.107 ** -0.07 6 * -0.143 *** -0.118 ***
(-1 .7 56) (-1 .7 64) (-2.357 ) (-2.122) (-2.568) (-1 .7 85) (-3.202) (-2.612)
Firm Idiosy ncratic Risk + 3.059 *** 3.550 *** 3.07 8 *** 3.017 *** 2.114 *** 2.514 *** 2.131 *** 2.014 ***
(9.403) (10.67 5) (9.465) (9.304) (12.434) (16.323) (12.057 ) (11 .643)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -0.811 * -0.362  -0.87 5 ** -0.7 7 3 * -0.47 7 ** -0.135  -0.437 ** -0.342 *
(-1 .935) (-0.863) (-2.086) (-1 .848) (-2.352) (-0.7 19) (-2.258) (-1 .7 60)
Average Risks Firm Idiosy ncratic Risk + 1.846 *** 2.521 *** 2.000 *** 1 .992 *** 0.7 62 *** 1 .085 *** 0.840 *** 0.835 ***
(7 .07 2) (9.016) (7 .603) (7 .607 ) (7 .660) (9.47 6) (7 .609) (7 .502)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -1 .162 ** -0.840 * -1 .551 *** -1 .486 *** -0.090  0.054  -0.37 1 * -0.286  
(-2.420) (-1 .7 58) (-3.208) (-3.082) (-0.445) (0.253) (-1 .855) (-1 .441)
Firm Idiosy ncratic Risk + 2.691 *** 3.893 *** 2.87 5 *** 2.869 ***
(7 .561) (9.915) (8.063) (8.07 4)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -1 .518 *** -1 .222 ** -1 .941 *** -1 .87 3 ***







Table V: Tests of Prediction 1 - Effects of Firm Risks on Pay-to-Performance Sensitivity of Total Equity Incentive Grants 
 
This table reports results for PPS of total equity incentives based on the regression (17). The sample period is 1992 to 2009 and the sample size is 12, 890 firm-years. CEO compensation and 
characteristics data are retrieved from ExecuComp, and firm characteristics data are from COMPUSTAT and CRSP. Total equity incentives are calculated with cumulative stock and option grants 
up to the fiscal year with respect to a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. Two versions of total equity incentives are obtained: Version 1 in Panel A is based on all available information while 
Version 2 in Panel B is computed using the one-year approximation method proposed by Core and Guay (2002a). In the base case, the risk measures are estimated using the market model.  There 
are four robustness tests.  The first test uses the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of the risk measures from the market model (base case), while the second test uses the risk measures 
obtained from the Fama-French three-factor model. The third test uses the industry average risk measures to proxy for the individual risk measures. The last robustness test runs an instrumental 
variable regression where the industry average risk measures are taken as the instrumental variables. All risk measures are annualized and calculated over the 60 months prior to the fiscal year. 
CEO tenure is the number of years a person has been the CEO of a firm. Firm size is measured by sales.  Firm growth is sales growth.  Free cash flow is operating cash flow minus dividends over 
assets. Four macro proxies are used in the regressions: industry sales growth, negative lagged commercial paper spread (NCP spread), GDP growth, and negative credit spread (Ncredit spread). 
The commercial paper spread is defined as the difference between the annualized rate on three-month commercial paper and the three-month T-bill rate, while the credit spread is the difference 
between the yield of Baa and Aaa bonds. All monetary variables are deflated using 2005 dollars. For brevity, only coefficients on risk measures are reported. For OLS regressions, standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level.  For median regressions, standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping with 500 replications. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 























Firm Idiosy ncratic Risk + 35.391 *** 37 .418 *** 35.250 *** 35.335 *** 28.269 *** 30.540 *** 28.511 *** 28.410 ***
(6.642) (6.636) (6.627 ) (6.642) (24.557 ) (25.7 92) (24.140) (24.808)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -22.466 *** -21 .7 85 *** -21 .835 *** -22.312 *** -11 .412 *** -10.866 *** -11.401 *** -10.906 ***
(-3.053) (-2.961) (-2.967 ) (-3.035) (-7 .188) (-7 .17 4) (-6.97 4) (-6.7 45)
Robustness Tests
CDF of Risks Firm Idiosy ncratic Risk + 22.684 *** 24.221 *** 22.618 *** 22.67 9 *** 14.153 *** 15.458 *** 14.27 9 *** 14.296 ***
(6.7 98) (6.7 86) (6.7 89) (6.807 ) (25.451) (24.7 31) (24.642) (25.250)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -6.348 *** -6.334 ** -6.036 ** -6.269 ** -1 .880 *** -1 .892 *** -2.135 *** -2.122 ***
(-2.581) (-2.57 8) (-2.442) (-2.546) (-3.7 46) (-3.815) (-4.280) (-4.420)
Firm Idiosy ncratic Risk + 40.67 3 *** 41.984 *** 40.619 *** 40.7 52 *** 31.297 *** 32.7 52 *** 31.37 6 *** 31.025 ***
(5.904) (5.951) (5.895) (5.917 ) (20.57 2) (21.829) (21.156) (20.7 01)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -17 .455 ** -16.144 ** -17 .151 ** -17 .536 ** -7 .994 *** -6.458 *** -7 .7 7 2 *** -7 .586 ***
(-2.242) (-2.055) (-2.199) (-2.253) (-4.67 8) (-3.880) (-4.665) (-4.532)
Average Risks Firm Idiosy ncratic Risk + 27 .405 *** 28.7 46 *** 26.983 *** 27 .325 *** 17 .305 *** 18.427 *** 17 .652 *** 17 .845 ***
(4.241) (4.113) (4.147 ) (4.199) (13.611) (13.805) (13.607 ) (14.292)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -29.910 *** -29.286 *** -28.813 *** -29.7 36 *** -7 .193 *** -5.519 *** -6.686 *** -7 .138 ***
(-3.281) (-3.211) (-3.151) (-3.258) (-3.57 8) (-2.831) (-3.250) (-3.531)
Firm Idiosy ncratic Risk + 38.7 11 *** 42.308 *** 38.024 *** 38.451 ***
(4.128) (3.985) (4.045) (4.089)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -36.410 *** -35.556 *** -34.824 *** -35.918 ***
(-3.493) (-3.426) (-3.344) (-3.454)
OLS Median
Risks measured as return 
volatility







Table V  



























Firm Idiosy ncratic Risk + 35.868 *** 38.263 *** 35.807 *** 35.850 *** 30.234 *** 32.112 *** 30.27 5 *** 30.262 ***
(6.640) (6.688) (6.639) (6.646) (25.817 ) (27 .897 ) (26.7 12) (27 .039)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -21 .916 *** -21 .055 *** -21 .458 *** -21 .849 *** -11 .27 7 *** -10.444 *** -11.317 *** -10.945 ***
(-2.938) (-2.823) (-2.87 4) (-2.931) (-6.548) (-6.698) (-6.860) (-6.633)
Robustness Tests
CDF of Risks Firm Idiosy ncratic Risk + 23.365 *** 25.203 *** 23.339 *** 23.37 3 *** 15.37 7 *** 16.321 *** 15.37 8 *** 15.369 ***
(6.891) (6.934) (6.893) (6.904) (27 .828) (27 .846) (27 .632) (27 .054)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -6.132 ** -6.084 ** -5.894 ** -6.093 ** -1 .941 *** -1 .664 *** -1 .981 *** -1 .921 ***
(-2.456) (-2.441) (-2.347 ) (-2.438) (-4.023) (-3.383) (-4.125) (-3.969)
Firm Idiosy ncratic Risk + 42.620 *** 44.196 *** 42.647 *** 42.7 03 *** 33.364 *** 34.887 *** 33.426 *** 33.359 ***
(6.125) (6.199) (6.132) (6.142) (23.167 ) (23.560) (23.392) (22.7 46)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -19.291 ** -17 .653 ** -19.090 ** -19.362 ** -7 .519 *** -6.7 48 *** -7 .942 *** -7 .661 ***
(-2.462) (-2.234) (-2.432) (-2.47 2) (-4.253) (-4.016) (-4.630) (-4.357 )
Average Risks Firm Idiosy ncratic Risk + 28.17 5 *** 30.016 *** 27 .893 *** 28.207 *** 19.064 *** 20.392 *** 19.087 *** 18.940 ***
(4.329) (4.260) (4.264) (4.309) (15.130) (15.351) (16.07 6) (16.37 8)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -28.608 *** -27 .660 *** -27 .831 *** -28.67 2 *** -5.7 19 *** -5.016 *** -5.911 *** -5.818 ***
(-3.101) (-2.996) (-3.005) (-3.102) (-2.869) (-2.7 05) (-3.205) (-3.103)
Firm Idiosy ncratic Risk + 40.07 2 *** 44.513 *** 39.548 *** 39.949 ***
(4.238) (4.157 ) (4.181) (4.219)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -35.100 *** -33.880 *** -33.839 *** -34.862 ***




Risks measured as return 
volatility
















Table VI  
Median Statistics for Annual Pay, Firm Size, Ratio between Annual Pay and Firm Size, and Firm Risks during 1992–2009 
 
This table reports median statistics for annual compensation, firm size, the ratio between annual pay and firm size, and firm risks for 12,890 firm-years over the period 1992 to 2009.  CEO 
compensation and characteristics data are retrieved from ExecuComp, and firm characteristics data are from COMPUSTAT and CRSP. Firm size is proxied by firm sales or market 
capitalization. Total firm return volatility is stock return volatility over the 60 months prior to the fiscal year. Firm systematic risk is equal to a firm's beta multiplied by stock market risk 
while firm idiosyncratic risk is the square root of the difference between total return variance and systematic return variance. All risk measures are annualized. The commercial paper 
spread is defined as the difference between the annualized rate on three-month commercial paper and the three-month T-bill rate, while the credit spread is the difference between the yield 
of Baa and Aaa bonds. All monetary variables are deflated using 2005 dollars. 
 
Y ear Total 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sample Size 12,890 122         412         57 2         637         694         7 45         7 83         7 96         809         861         939         97 7        1 ,009     986         567         640         67 2         669         
Annual Pay  (millions)
Equity  Incentive Pay 1.020$  0.7 65$ 0.805$ 0.7 20$ 0.862$  1 .143$   1 .17 4$  1 .37 0$  1 .415$   1 .624$  1 .582$  1 .380$  1 .659$  1 .800$  2.691$  3.197$  3.301$  2.7 7 1$  
Total Compensation 2.850$  1 .995$  1 .962$  1 .902$  1 .999$  2.422$  2.520$  2.566$  2.827$  2.854$  2.913$  2.652$  3.130$  3.123$  3.939$  4.006$ 4.159$  3.516$  
Firm Size (billions)
Sales 4.988$  1 .951$   1 .343$  1 .262$  1 .310$  1 .37 7$  1 .37 8$  1 .17 1$   1 .238$  1 .205$  1 .188$   1 .169$   1 .257$  1 .284$  1 .57 8$  1 .821$   1 .915$   1 .624$  
Market Capitalization 4.832$  1 .7 7 9$  1 .231$   1 .224$  1 .17 6$  1 .386$  1 .427$  1 .242$  1 .17 9$  1 .227$  1 .132$   1 .356$  1 .650$  1 .618$   2.17 3$  2.423$  1 .530$  1 .7 26$  
Rpay /si ze = Total Pay /Size
Total Pay  / Sales                          
($/a thousand $) 0.47 6$ 0.947$ 1 .308$  1 .395$  1 .424$  1 .57 9$  1 .7 45$  1 .910$  2.07 6$ 2.058$  2.148$  2.090$ 2.159$  2.219$  2.129$  2.114$   2.003$ 2.185$  
Total Pay  /Market Cap
($/a thousand $) 0.519$  1 .025$  1 .587$  1 .500$  1 .542$  1 .501$  1 .7 7 2$  2.010$  2.150$  2.185$  2.354$  1 .87 0$  1 .814$   1 .831$   1 .615$   1 .613$   2.467$  1 .944$  
Firm Risks
Firm Idiosyncratic Risk 22% 26% 29% 30% 30% 30% 31% 33% 37 % 42% 44% 46% 46% 42% 35% 30% 28% 29%
Firm Sy stematic Risk 21% 16% 14% 14% 11% 8% 8% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 16% 16% 15% 13% 11% 15%
Macroeconomic Variables
Industry  Sales Growth 3.8% 1.8% 6.6% 12.0% 5.5% 3.7 % 7 .1% 6.9% 4.6% -3.3% -2.6% 5.5% 7 .6% 1.4% 5.7 % 3.1% 3.6% -8.5%
Commerical Paper Spread 
(basis points)
33 24 15 29 27 26 38 43 40 31 17 5 8 1 20 25 44 7 3
GDP Growth 3.4% 2.9% 4.1% 2.5% 3.7 % 4.5% 4.4% 4.8% 4.1% 1.1% 1.8% 2.5% 3.6% 3.1% 2.7 % 1.9% 0.0% -2.6%
Credit Spread (basis points) 84 7 1 66 61 68 60 69 83 7 5 87 131 110 7 6 83 89 92 181 198
 
Table VII  
Tests of Prediction 2 – Effects of Firm Risks on Pay-Size Ratio 
 
This table reports results for the pay-size ratio based on the regression (18). The sample period is 1992 to 2009 and the sample size is 12, 890 firm-years. CEO compensation and characteristics 
data are retrieved from ExecuComp, and firm characteristics data are from COMPUSTAT and CRSP. The pay-size ratio is the ratio between CEO total compensation and the firm’s sales. Panel A 
presents the base case results where the risk measures are estimated using the market model. We also run regressions by replacing “idiosyncratic” and “systematic” risks with “total risk.” The 
coefficient and t-value for total risk are reported at the bottom of the table. Panel B presents results of four robustness tests.  The first test uses the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of the 
risk measures from the market model (base case), while the second test uses the risk measures obtained from the Fama-French three-factor model. The third test uses the industry average risk 
measures to proxy for the individual risk measures. The last robustness test runs an instrumental variable regression where the industry average risk measures are taken as the instrumental 
variables. All risk measures are annualized and calculated over the 60 months prior to the fiscal year. CEO tenure is the number of years a person has been the CEO of a firm. Firm size is 
measured by sales.  Firm growth is sales growth.  Free cash flow is operating cash flow minus dividends over assets. Four macro proxies are used in the regressions: industry sales growth, negative 
lagged commercial paper spread (NCP spread), GDP growth, and negative credit spread (Ncredit spread). The commercial paper spread is defined as the difference between the annualized rate on 
three-month commercial paper and the three-month T-bill rate, while the credit spread is the difference between the yield of Baa and Aaa bonds. All monetary variables are deflated using 2005 
dollars. For brevity, only coefficients on risk measures are reported. For OLS regressions, standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  For median regressions, standard errors are calculated by 
bootstrapping with 500 replications. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Prediction: This Model
Firm Idiosy ncratic Risk + 12.660 *** 13.493 *** 12.668 *** 12.660 *** 6.388 *** 6.837 *** 6.428 *** 6.398 ***
(12.446) (12.642) (12.425) (12.439) (27 .959) (31.204) (31.183) (28.483)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -8.487 *** -8.094 *** -8.522 *** -8.495 *** -3.402 *** -3.404 *** -3.7 7 6 *** -3.585 ***
(-5.507 ) (-5.317 ) (-5.519) (-5.518) (-10.27 7 ) (-10.049) (-11 .7 99) (-11 .097 )
Industry  Sales Growth 0.536   -0.57 4 ***  
(0.842) (-3.018)
NCP Spread (basis points) -0.031 *** -0.012 ***
(-6.97 9) (-10.824)
GDP Growth -2.620   -7 .969 ***  
(-0.689) (-7 .826)
NCredit Spread (basis points) -0.001  -0.004 ***
 (-0.399) (-8.396)
CEO Age -0.058 *** -0.052 *** -0.057 *** -0.057 *** -0.011 *** -0.009 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 ***
(-2.959) (-2.67 8) (-2.932) (-2.937 ) (-3.229) (-3.007 ) (-3.101) (-2.7 89)
CEO Tenure 0.046 *** 0.043 *** 0.046 *** 0.046 *** 0.014 *** 0.015 *** 0.016 *** 0.016 ***
(2.900) (2.7 02) (2.908) (2.904) (4.491) (4.443) (5.034) (4.822)
Firm Growth 3.207 *** 3.488 *** 3.304 *** 3.285 *** 0.360 ** 0.439 *** 0.455 *** 0.426 ***
(5.959) (6.515) (6.160) (6.17 8) (2.494) (2.986) (3.027 ) (2.97 9)
Free Cash Flow -24.659 *** -24.445 *** -24.666 *** -24.659 *** -0.969 ** -0.829 * -0.953 ** -1 .024 **
(-7 .47 0) (-7 .458) (-7 .484) (-7 .486) (-2.094) (-1 .827 ) (-2.067 ) (-2.146)
Capital/Sales 2.860 *** 2.835 *** 2.864 *** 2.864 *** 0.901 *** 0.87 8 *** 0.923 *** 0.923 ***
(8.018) (7 .939) (8.009) (8.011) (14.7 26) (15.302) (14.617 ) (15.036)
RD/Capital 3.401 *** 3.337 *** 3.395 *** 3.397 *** 2.613 *** 2.57 8 *** 2.635 *** 2.597 ***
(9.485) (9.329) (9.448) (9.440) (16.7 61) (15.617 ) (16.504) (16.066)
RD Missing Dummy -0.680 *** -0.653 *** -0.681 *** -0.681 *** 0.055  0.082 ** 0.045  0.048  
(-2.87 4) (-2.7 80) (-2.881) (-2.87 9) (1 .336) (2.007 ) (1 .249) (1 .258)
Advertising/Capital 0.185  0.215  0.195  0.192  0.685 *** 0.7 25 *** 0.7 47 *** 0.7 39 ***
(0.304) (0.355) (0.321) (0.316) (4.098) (4.7 26) (4.87 1) (4.952)
Advertising Missing Dummy 0.512 ** 0.494 ** 0.528 ** 0.525 ** 0.241 *** 0.247 *** 0.286 *** 0.298 ***
(2.47 5) (2.390) (2.545) (2.524) (5.328) (5.510) (6.7 04) (6.853)
Investment/Capital 4.623 *** 4.251 *** 4.656 *** 4.649 *** 1 .37 3 *** 1 .239 *** 1 .445 *** 1 .525 ***
(4.985) (4.600) (5.025) (5.011) (6.206) (5.7 06) (6.57 1) (6.814)
Adjusted or Pseudo R2 0.37 2 0.37 5 0.37 2 0.37 2 0.148 0.151 0.150 0.150
Alternative Model
Firm Total Risk 9.144 *** 10.07 2 *** 9.139 *** 9.139 *** 5.061 *** 5.542 *** 4.990 *** 4.966 ***
(11 .132) (11 .499) (11 .121) (11 .118) (25.847 ) (25.7 41) (25.282) (25.190)
Adjusted or Pseudo R2 0.360 0.363 0.360 0.360 0.139 0.141 0.140 0.140
Panel A: Rpay /size = Annual Total Pay /Sales ($/a thousand $)
OLS Median
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CDF of Risks Firm Idiosy ncratic Risk + 6.254 *** 6.7 32 *** 6.256 *** 6.252 *** 2.919 *** 3.129 *** 2.887 *** 2.888 ***
(15.407 ) (15.568) (15.382) (15.403) (37 .908) (34.884) (36.939) (35.368)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -1 .507 *** -1 .47 7 *** -1 .515 *** -1 .507 *** -0.7 08 *** -0.67 *** -0.7 6 *** -0.7 24 ***
(-4.231) (-4.162) (-4.207 ) (-4.219) (-9.37 0) (-8.886) (-10.241) (-9.17 4)
Firm Idiosy ncratic Risk + 12.499 *** 13.088 *** 12.492 *** 12.494 *** 6.589 *** 6.859 *** 6.64 *** 6.585 ***
(9.7 51) (10.047 ) (9.7 41) (9.7 52) (24.320) (26.985) (25.298) (25.406)
Model Firm Sy stematic Risk - -2.645  -1 .921  -2.643  -2.647  -1 .366 *** -1 .051 *** -1 .492 *** -1 .397 ***
(-1 .537 ) (-1 .119) (-1 .536) (-1 .538) (-3.445) (-2.7 30) (-3.888) (-3.562)
Average Risks Firm Idiosy ncratic Risk + 9.527 *** 10.219 *** 9.589 *** 9.565 *** 3.681 *** 3.865 *** 3.7 63 *** 3.67 9 ***
(10.963) (11.038) (10.945) (10.960) (20.997 ) (21.041) (21 .411) (20.932)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -10.265 *** -9.928 *** -10.412 *** -10.344 *** -2.865 *** -2.7 55 *** -3.246 *** -3.019 ***
(-5.7 36) (-5.565) (-5.7 92) (-5.7 83) (-7 .7 64) (-7 .07 3) (-8.456) (-8.236)
Firm Idiosy ncratic Risk + 12.62 *** 13.443 *** 12.628 *** 12.619 ***
(12.411) (12.603) (12.390) (12.404)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -8.485 *** -8.095 *** -8.52 *** -8.492 ***
(-5.506) (-5.319) (-5.517 ) (-5.516)







 Internet Appendix for  
“Optimal CEO Compensation with Search:  
Theory and Empirical Evidence”* 
 
This internet appendix contains two tables whose details are explained below: 
  
 Table IA.I presents the effects of idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk measured by return volatilities on 
pay-to-performance sensitivity (PPS) after controlling for the effect of dollar risk measures. The 
regression is the expansion of equation (17) by adding the dollar risk measures as the additional control 
variables. The dollar risk measures are defined as a firm’s market capitalization multiplied by the 
volatility of stock returns. The dependent variable is either the new equity incentive PPS or the total 
equity incentive PPS. The new equity incentive PPS is calculated as stock and option grants for the fiscal 
year with respect to a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth while the total equity incentive PPS is 
calculated as cumulative stock and option grants up to the fiscal year with respect to a $1,000 change in 
shareholder wealth. Two versions of total equity incentives are obtained as follows: Version 1 is based on 
all available information while Version 2 is computed using the one-year approximation method 
proposed by Core and Guay (2002). 
 
 Table IA.II presents the effects of idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk measured by return volatilities 
on the pay-to-size ratio using equation (18). A firm’s size is measured either as its market capitalization 
or book value of total assets. The base case regression is run with risk measures that are estimated from 
the market model.  Four robustness tests are performed. The first robustness test runs equation (18) 
with a nonlinear transformation of the base case risk measures. The transformation is performed using 
the cumulative distribution function approach proposed by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999). The second 
robustness test runs equation (18) using risk measures computed from the Fama-French three-factor 
model. The last two robustness tests account for potential endogeneity of firm risks. In the third 
robustness check, we replace individual firm risk measures with average industry risk measures. The last 
robustness check involves running instrument variables regression to account for potential endogeneity 
effects, whereby the average industry risk measures are taken as the instrumental variables. Since there 
is no standard procedure to run median regressions with instrumental variables, we only perform the 














* Citation format: Melanie Cao, and Rong Wang, Internet Appendix for “Optimal CEO Compensation with Search: Theory 
and Empirical Evidence,” Journal of Finance [DOI STRING]. Please note: Wiley-Blackwell is not responsible for the 
content or functionality of any supporting information supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing material) 
should be directed to the authors of the article. 
 Table IA.I  
Regressions for PPS after Controlling for the Effects of Dollar Risk Measures 
 
Modified Regression (17) PPS= a₁ + a₂Firm idiosyncratic risk + a₃Firm systematic risk + a₄Firm idiosyncratic dollar risk + a₅Firm systematic dollar risk 
+ a₆Macro proxy+ a₇CEO Age+ a₈CEO Tenure+ a₉log(Firm size)+ a₁₀Firm growth+ a₁₁Free cash flow+ a₁₂Capital/sales 
+ a₁₃R&D/capital + a₁₄R&D missing dummy+ a₁₅Advertising/capital+ a16Advertising missing dummy+ a17Investment/capital+ε. 
 
This table reports regression results of new equity incentives and total equity incentives using the above model for 12, 890 firm-years over the period 1992 to 2009. The CEO 
compensation and characteristics data are retrieved from ExecuComp, and firm characteristics data are from COMPUSTAT and CRSP. New equity incentives are the PPS for a CEO 
based on stock and option grants for the fiscal year with respect to a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. Total equity incentives are calculated using cumulative stock and option 
grants up to the fiscal year with respect to a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. Two versions of total equity incentives are obtained: Version 1 is based on all available information 
while Version 2 is computed using the one-year approximation method proposed by Core and Guay (2002). Firm total risk is stock return volatility over the 60 months prior to the 
fiscal year. Firm systematic risk is equal to a firm's beta multiplied by the stock market risk while firm idiosyncratic risk is the square root of the difference between total return 
variance and systematic return variance.  Dollar risk measures are defined as a firm’s market capitalization multiplied by the volatility of stock returns. In the regressions, we use the 
cumulative distribution functions of dollar risk measures instead of the raw value. CEO tenure is the number of years a person has been the CEO of a firm.  Firm size is measured by 
sales.  Firm growth is sales growth.  Free cash flow is operating cash flow minus dividends over assets. NCP spread is the negative lagged commercial paper spread and NCredit spread 
is the negative credit spread.  The commercial paper spread is defined as the difference between the annualized rate on three-month commercial paper and the three-month T-bill rate, 
while the credit spread is the difference between the yield of Baa and Aaa bonds. All monetary variables are deflated using 2005 dollars. To save space, only coefficients on the four risk 
measures are reported.  For OLS regressions, standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  For median regressions, standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping with 500 
























New Equity Incentives Firm Idiosyncratic Risk + 3.142 *** 3.517 *** 3.129 *** 3.136 *** 2.208 *** 2.564 *** 2.181 *** 2.189 ***
(8.900) (9.745) (8.902) (8.918) (13.655) (13.836) (12.431) (12.445)
Firm Systematic Risk - -0.595  0.120  -0.589  -0.561  -0.562 ** -0.247  -0.661 ** -0.606 *
(-0.894) (0.180) (-0.889) (-0.845) (-2.017) (-0.785) (-2.136) (-1.949)
Dollar Firm Idiosyncratic Risk -4.472 *** -3.085 *** -4.258 *** -4.467 *** -2.456 *** -1.799 *** -2.527 *** -2.576 ***
(-4.400) (-3.015) (-4.193) (-4.418) (-5.310) (-3.658) (-5.214) (-5.315)
Dollar Firm Systematic Risk -0.248  -1.583  -0.625  -0.506  0.074  -0.48  0.004  -0.048  
(-0.225) (-1.434) (-0.567) (-0.460) (0.159) (-0.933) (0.007) (-0.092)
Firm Idiosyncratic Risk + 39.478 *** 40.475 *** 39.544 *** 39.453 *** 32.62 *** 33.69 *** 32.348 *** 32.488 ***
(5.862) (5.885) (5.881) (5.869) (20.943) (20.798) (20.429) (20.152)
Firm Systematic Risk - -18.499  -16.272  -18.531  -18.497  -15.443 *** -13.289 *** -14.652 *** -14.573 ***
(-1.575) (-1.393) (-1.579) (-1.577) (-6.280) (-5.074) (-5.744) (-5.717)
Dollar Firm Idiosyncratic Risk -41.459 ** -37.413 * -42.172 ** -41.486 ** -29.051 *** -24.742 *** -27.63 *** -27.933 ***
(-2.143) (-1.928) (-2.174) (-2.144) (-7.063) (-6.136) (-6.811) (-6.805)
Dollar Firm Systematic Risk -0.779  -4.801  0.530  -0.583  13.810 *** 10.256 ** 11.79 *** 12.141 ***
(-0.036) (-0.223) (0.024) (-0.027) (3.285) (2.483) (2.822) (2.853)
Firm Idiosyncratic Risk + 38.935 *** 40.181 *** 39.042 *** 38.928 *** 33.906 *** 35.16 *** 33.756 *** 34.321 ***
(5.714) (5.771) (5.736) (5.720) (22.794) (23.672) (23.816) (24.343)
Firm Systematic Risk - -15.165  -12.358  -15.269  -15.159  -13.762 *** -12.801 *** -13.523 *** -14.268 ***
(-1.279) (-1.049) (-1.289) (-1.280) (-6.110) (-5.834) (-6.295) (-6.580)
Dollar Firm Idiosyncratic Risk -37.019 * -32.017  -37.547 * -37.029 * -29.422 *** -25.868 *** -27.975 *** -29.245 ***
(-1.890) (-1.630) (-1.912) (-1.890) (-7.533) (-6.752) (-7.669) (-7.827)
Dollar Firm Systematic Risk -7.151  -12.141  -6.098  -7.139  11.442 *** 9.270 ** 9.845 *** 11.372 ***
(-0.326) (-0.558) (-0.277) (-0.325) (2.819) (2.494) (2.708) (3.069)
OLS Median
Total Equity Incentives 
Measured using Available 
Information 
Total Equity Incentives 
Measured using One-Year 
Approximation Method
 
 Table IA.II  
Results for Pay-Size Ratio Tests with Market Capitalization and Book Assets as Firm Size 
 
Regression (18) R_pay/size = a₁ + a₂Firm idiosyncratic risk + a₃Firm systematic risk + a₄Macro proxy + a₅CEO Age+ a₆CEO Tenure + a₇log(Firm size)+a₈Firm growth+ a₉Free cash 
flow+a₁₀Capital/sales+ a₁₁R&D/capital +a₁₂R&D missing dummy+a₁₃Advertising/capital+ a₁₄Advertising missing dummy+a₁₅Investment/capital+ε. 
 
This table reports results for the pay-size ratio based on the above regression. The sample period is 1992 to 2009 and the sample size is 12,890 firm-years. CEO compensation and 
characteristics data are retrieved from ExecuComp, and firm characteristics data are from COMPUSTAT and CRSP. In Panel A, the pay-size ratio is the ratio between CEO total 
compensation and market capitalization. In Panel B, the pay-size ratio is the ratio between CEO total compensation and book value of assets.  The base case presents results where the 
risk measures are estimated using the market model. We also run four robustness tests.  The first test uses the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of the risk measures from the 
market model (base case) while the second test uses the risk measures obtained from the Fama-French three-factor model. The third test uses the industry average risk measures to 
proxy for the individual risk measures. The last robustness test runs instrumental variables regression, where the industry average risk measures are taken as the instrumental 
variables. All risk measures are annualized and calculated over the 60 months prior to the fiscal year. CEO tenure is the number of years a person has been the CEO of a firm. Firm size 
is measured by sales.  Firm growth is sales growth.  Free cash flow is operating cash flow minus dividends over assets. Four macro proxies are used in the regressions: industry sales 
growth, negative lagged commercial paper spread (NCP spread), GDP growth, and negative credit spread (Ncredit spread). The commercial paper spread is defined as the difference 
between the annualized rate on three-month commercial paper and the three-month T-bill rate while the credit spread is the difference between the yield of Baa and Aaa bonds. All 
monetary variables are deflated using 2005 dollars. For brevity, only coefficients on risk measures are reported. For OLS regressions, standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  





















Firm Idiosyncratic Risk + 9.119 *** 10.087 *** 9.204 *** 9.212 *** 6.301 *** 6.7 95 *** 6.321 *** 6.281 ***
(18.7 01) (19.7 67 ) (18.858) (18.892) (33.302) (32.938) (32.824) (32.347 )
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -7 .192 *** -6.7 5 *** -7 .409 *** -7 .37 2 *** -4.37 4 *** -4.344 *** -4.444 *** -4.419 ***
(-9.493) (-9.008) (-9.7 44) (-9.696) (-17 .242) (-17 .214) (-16.814) (-15.7 27 )
Robustness Tests
CDF of Risks Firm Idiosyncratic Risk + 5.633 *** 6.31 *** 5.683 *** 5.67 8 *** 3.263 *** 3.614 *** 3.28 *** 3.257 ***
(22.508) (23.913) (22.664) (22.67 6) (39.946) (47 .623) (40.668) (42.507 )
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -1 .802 *** -1 .7 59 *** -1 .901 *** -1 .883 *** -0.963 *** -0.97 5 *** -0.999 *** -0.951 ***
(-8.430) (-8.337 ) (-8.809) (-8.7 50) (-14.340) (-15.339) (-13.864) (-13.57 0)
Firm Idiosyncratic Risk + 10.395 *** 11 .07 5 *** 10.462 *** 10.421 *** 6.954 *** 7 .17 *** 6.969 *** 6.855 ***
(15.619) (16.425) (15.7 21) (15.67 3) (25.7 81) (31.387 ) (25.939) (26.7 17 )
Model Firm Sy stematic Risk - -4.939 *** -4.113 *** -5.028 *** -4.923 *** -2.67 3 *** -2.358 *** -2.7 1 *** -2.538 ***
(-6.012) (-5.037 ) (-6.116) (-5.995) (-8.646) (-9.07 6) (-8.838) (-8.450)
Average Risks Firm Idiosyncratic Risk + 5.991 *** 6.968 *** 6.196 *** 6.243 *** 3.508 *** 3.96 *** 3.598 *** 3.57 5 ***
(10.864) (11 .981) (11 .181) (11 .293) (19.267 ) (19.922) (18.242) (18.405)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -6.223 *** -5.7 33 *** -6.7 03 *** -6.7 3 *** -3.402 *** -3.448 *** -3.638 *** -3.559 ***
(-6.589) (-6.102) (-7 .027 ) (-7 .063) (-11 .991) (-11 .469) (-12.008) (-11 .563)
Firm Idiosyncratic Risk + 9.103 *** 10.067 *** 9.19 *** 9.196 ***
(18.685) (19.7 41) (18.845) (18.87 8)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -7 .188 *** -6.7 46 *** -7 .408 *** -7 .368 ***
(-9.513) (-9.035) (-9.7 69) (-9.7 17 )






Risks measured as 
return v olatility
 
 Table IA.II   





















Firm Idiosyncratic Risk + 9.522 *** 10.104 *** 9.509 *** 9.513 *** 6.313 *** 6.7 61 *** 6.358 *** 6.337 ***
(17 .913) (18.100) (17 .862) (17 .881) (37 .459) (38.7 68) (35.367 ) (35.321)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -7 .217 *** -6.942 *** -7 .193 *** -7 .207 *** -4.450 *** -4.469 *** -4.620 *** -4.519 ***
(-8.330) (-8.090) (-8.286) (-8.318) (-16.316) (-16.208) (-17 .002) (-16.481)
Robustness Tests
CDF of Risks Firm Idiosyncratic Risk + 5.200 *** 5.57 3 *** 5.192 *** 5.195 *** 3.083 *** 3.290 *** 3.099 *** 3.098 ***
(21 .668) (21.856) (21.643) (21 .654) (42.07 6) (43.285) (40.585) (40.900)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -1 .596 *** -1 .57 2 *** -1 .582 *** -1 .589 *** -0.926 *** -0.923 *** -0.949 *** -0.949 ***
(-7 .121) (-7 .046) (-7 .014) (-7 .07 9) (-13.214) (-12.035) (-13.469) (-13.920)
Firm Idiosyncratic Risk + 10.7 25 *** 11 .120 *** 10.7 03 *** 10.7 18 *** 7 .230 *** 7 .528 *** 7 .310 *** 7 .269 ***
(15.923) (16.243) (15.881) (15.913) (32.07 5) (32.243) (31.7 7 4) (31.927 )
Model Firm Sy stematic Risk - -4.7 00 *** -4.214 *** -4.67 4 *** -4.7 03 *** -2.997 *** -2.7 18 *** -3.066 *** -3.025 ***
(-5.035) (-4.524) (-5.005) (-5.036) (-9.397 ) (-7 .836) (-9.464) (-9.37 8)
Average Risks Firm Idiosyncratic Risk + 6.7 16 *** 7 .17 5 *** 6.7 09 *** 6.7 19 *** 3.952 *** 4.199 *** 3.998 *** 3.97 2 ***
(12.647 ) (12.695) (12.535) (12.589) (24.227 ) (24.087 ) (24.426) (26.062)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -7 .340 *** -7 .117 *** -7 .323 *** -7 .345 *** -3.7 56 *** -3.7 66 *** -3.920 *** -3.931 ***
(-6.7 42) (-6.548) (-6.683) (-6.7 40) (-10.919) (-11 .139) (-11 .7 59) (-12.268)
Firm Idiosyncratic Risk + 9.496 *** 10.07 3 *** 9.483 *** 9.487 ***
(17 .865) (18.049) (17 .814) (17 .833)
Firm Sy stematic Risk - -7 .191 *** -6.918 *** -7 .168 *** -7 .181 ***






Panel B: Rpay/size = Annual Total Pay /Total Assets ($/a thousand $)
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